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ABSTRACT
The 1996 welfare reform relies heavily on work as an 
antidote to "dependency." But have we any reason to expect 
work requirements to spur people to leave welfare? Recent 
experience provides an opportunity to analyze the effects 
of work requirements. The Job Opportunities and Basic 
Skills (JOBS) program was created as part of the Family 
Support Act of 1988 (FSA), a welfare reform that 
established work requirements for recipients of Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). JOBS can be 
thought of as a case study in work requirements. Since the 
1996 reform relies on work requirements to reduce welfare 
participation, it is easy to justify a search for empirical 
evidence of that connection. This research analyzes the 
impact of the JOBS program in the American states. The 
effects of work requirements are estimated within a 
quantitative model of AFDC participation that draws heavily 
from two theoretical perspectives.
The results generally support development and rational 
choice theories. However, work requirements associated 
with the 1988 reform have not significantly affected AFDC 
participation rates. The estimate of JOBS' impact is 
negative, as expected, but quite small. A percentage point
increase in JOBS participation is associated with a decline 
in AFDC recipiency the following year of just 0.008 
percentage points. When the model is applied to a real 
case, the magnitude of JOBS' effect on AFDC participation 
ranks ninth among ten variables.
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: WHY ANALYZE JOBS?
Progressive political movements of the early twentieth 
century ushered the United States into the community of 
welfare states. Mothers' pensions, which appeared at the 
state level in 1911, took the first step toward large-scale 
government assistance to economically distressed 
households. The national government intervened two decades 
later, when President Roosevelt signed the Social Security 
Act of 1935. Included in this landmark legislation was the 
Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program, which directed the 
states to establish and maintain public assistance 
programs. ADC was viewed as an acceptable corrective to a 
poverty problem that was greatly exacerbated by a depressed 
economy. In the decades since the Great Depression, 
however, the American welfare system has lost political 
capital.
Most Americans now think of the welfare system as a 
major national problem. This tarnished image evolved 
gradually, as did a belief that entitlements spawned 
dependency on government assistance and trapped people in a 
culture of poverty (Sundquist 1986, 518; Wilson 1987) . In 
1935, mothers with children were not expected to work
outside the home; but the Second World War cast mothers 
into the labor force. By 1962, when ADC was revairped into 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) , ideas about 
welfare were already changing in response to the 
feminization of the leibor force (Johnson and Tafoya 1999,
3) .
Social unrest of the 1960s, and a conservative 
backlash that followed, also altered the landscape of 
welfare politics (Sundquist 1986, 529). Issues relating to 
gender, race, budgets, incentives emd fairness complicated 
the discussion. The old welfare system was accused of 
harming mothers and African-Americans by excusing them from 
work. Taxpayers resented government support for second- 
generation welfare recipients. Politicians from both 
parties hatched plans to get people off welfare. The main 
themes of the reform movement have been individual 
responsibility and work.
The Work Incentive (WIN) program, established in 1967, 
was the first nation-wide effort to stimulate work through 
economic incentives and varying degrees of coercion (Ostow 
and Dutka 1975, 72). The focus on incentives is symbolized 
by earnings disregards, which allowed working recipients to 
keep more of their earnings. WIN also forced the states to
establish work programs and sanction recipients for 
noncompliance. These policies represent an important 
philosophical step toward serious reform. At the street 
level, however, WIN did little more than create a 
"substantial amount of hassle and inconvenience for those 
on the rolls" (Teles 1998, 95).
Despite WIN'S failure (Gordon 1978), most experts 
continued to harbor faith in welfare-to-work policies. The 
next meuiifestation of this thinking was the 1988 Family 
Support Act (FSA) and its centerpiece, the Job 
Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program. JOBS, a 
labor activation program, was designed to facilitate 
transitions from welfare to work. The work requirements 
and sanctions contained in JOBS legislation weakened the 
entitlement status of welfare, leaving it vulnerable to 
subsequent reforms.
Prior to 1996, certain people (single mothers, 
primarily) at certain low levels of income possessed a 
right to public assistance across the United States. Thus, 
AFDC was a means-tes ted entitlement. By the middle of the 
1980s, however, it had become politically feasible to 
require work in exchange for the welfare benefit. This
made the welfare check more like consideration in exchange 
for performance, and less like an entitlement.
On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed into law 
the latest welfare reform— the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 (P.L. 
104-193), also known as the Welfare Reform Act of 1996.
The 1996 reform abolished AFDC and created in its place a 
program called Teitç)orary Assistance for Needy Fêunilies 
(TANF) . The TANF program is based on the notion that 
welfare should be temporary or transitional, but not a way 
of life.
Expanding welfare rolls indicate widespread 
dependency; so, the best approach to human services is the 
one that will get the most people off the dole. Welfare to 
work initiatives hold down caseloads in two important ways. 
JOBS cuid TANF both contained substantial provision for 
support services, like child-care subsidies, to help people 
up from dependency. Also, the work requirement leads to 
sanctioning, euid eventually termination of the benefit, for 
those who refuse to comply. AFDC participation^ has indeed 
declined precipitously since the stiff work requirements
‘ In this study, the terms "participation'' and "recipiency" are used interchangeably.
associated with the 1996 reform were iirplemented. Policy 
analysts disagree, however, as to work requirements' 
demonstrable impact on welfare rolls.
The timing of JOBS suggests that work requirements can 
contribute to reductions in public assistance rolls. This 
presumed effect is part of the justification for requiring 
public aid recipients to participate in work activities. 
This view is affirmed in the 1996 reform, which again puts 
faith in the efficacy of work requirements. But is this 
faith warranted? Ceui reform policies, specifically work 
requirements, reduce the proportion of the population on 
welfare? The 1988 welfare reform provides a case study in 
the effects of work requirements. By estimating the effect 
of JOBS on AFDC participation, we can partially answer the 
question of whether work requirements are effective in 
decreasing welfare rolls. Field studies indicate that JOBS 
did move recipients from welfare to work under certain 
conditions in certain states (Gueron and Pauly 1991; Mead 
1995, 7) .
The downward shift in AFDC caseload growth beginning 
in 1992 (see Figure 1) has enhanced the rhetorical currency 
of work requirements. This is because JOBS was fully 
implemented in all states by 1991. Given a year to work.
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Figure 1. AFDC and JOBS Participation Rates, 1984-1996
Note: AFDC is the mean [N=50 states] of AFDC recipients per 100 people 
below age 65. JOBS is the mean JOBS participeints per 100 non-exempt 
AFDC participeuits (lagged one year) .
JOBS may have contributed to the 1992 slowdown and, from 
1993 on, actual reduction of the participation rate. 
Declining rolls suggest a potential for reducing the size 
of the AFDC population with work programs. According to 
Mead {1997, 121-122), however, the dependence of program 
outcomes on local administration suggests the potential for 
wide variation across states. As Lurie (1998, 103) notes, 
"each state tends to put its own spin on welfare reform."
Some studies (Council of Economic Advisers 1997;
Gueron and Pauly 1991; Mead 1995; Friedlander and Burtless 
1994; Schiller and Brasher 1990, 1993) find positive 
results from welfare-to-work programs. The well-known work 
of Lawrence Mead (1988; 1995; 1997) casts an especially 
favorable light on the work strategy. Other research 
suggests that reforms had little to do with the decline in 
welfare participation (a recent example is Ziliak et al. 
1997, 32). Abundant research instead connects economic and 
social forces with AFDC participation, thereby minimizing 
the iitç)ortance of policy (Barr and Hall 1981; Fording 1997; 
Hicks and Swemk 1983; Moffitt 1992; Plemt 1984).
This research adds to the literature a performance 
euialysis of JOBS across all fifty states over the last 
thirteen years of AFDC. The latter half of the time series
is the post intervention era—the intervention being JOBS. 
The more recent, and more aggressive, welfare reform 
legislation of 1996 again relies heavily on work 
requirements to reduce welfare dependence. An inverse 
relationship between work requirements and welfare 
caseloads has been assumed for some time. However, 
previous research on work incentive programs has been 
inconclusive. The presumed effect remains an empirical 
question. This research attempts to answer the empirical 
question of whether work requirement policies reduce 
welfare participation rates by analyzing the impact of the 
JOBS program in the American states.
Testing for statistically significant effects from a 
policy variable can serve three purposes. First is the 
practitioner's desire to evaluate programs regarding 
desired effects and actual effects. The second desire 
served is the political scientist's hope of finding 
abstract theories euid empirical data that somehow fit 
together. Finally, the most important reason to evaluate 
work requirements involves welfare recipients themselves. 
These three justifications are discussed in detail below.
Three Justifications for Evaluating JOBS
The most obvious justification for studying JOBS might 
be put forth by an administrator in a state Department of 
Human Services. Welfare practitioners need to know if the 
program made a difference, especially since work programs 
have not changed much since the enactment of TANF. Other 
justifications may not be as obvious. Theorists, for 
example, might investigate welfare with different motives. 
They use the welfare policy arena as a proving ground for 
theoretical conjectures. Perhaps the least obvious 
justification for studying welfare reform is the effect it 
has had on the rights of citizens. These three parties to 
the welfare debate— practitioners, theorists and citizens—  
are discussed in this section. Then, the next section 
offers a justification for the research design employed in 
this particular study.
Practitioners
The main goal of welfare reform is to move recipients 
off the welfare rolls. At the seune time, policymakers at 
all levels in the federal system appear convinced that 
state-level flexibility is the best way to accomplish this 
goal (Teles 1998, 179). In fact, according to Jencks 
(1997, 1) , the most inportcuit feature of the 1996 welfare
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reform is the transfer of power from Washington to the 
states. It is now within the scope of state government to 
develop criteria for delivery of benefits and determining 
eligibility.^ Congress and the president agree that states 
rather them the national government should decide how 
welfare is done (Cammisa 1998, 72) . Policymakers have also 
agreed, for some years now, that work is the primary answer 
to welfare dependency.
The 1996 reform, a product of long-awaited consensus, 
fundamentally altered public assistance programs in the 
American states. Under prior law, AFDC provided income 
support to families with children deprived of parental 
support. The new law combines the old public assistance 
function (AFDC) , Emergency Assistance (EA) , euid the 
training/employment function into a single block grant to 
states called Terrqporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) .
TANF is all cüaout personal responsibility, and this 
concept is embodied in the new time-limited nature of
^Federal direction is now more limited, but states must still incorporate certain legislative priorities. States 
are required to comply with national standards in several areas, including time limits on welfare 
participation, work requirements, appropriate work activities, penalties for drug- related convictions, teen 
parent provisions, access to Medicaid, establishment of paternity, child support enforcement, immigrants, 
child-care assistance, and Food Stamp eligibility.
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welfare benefits. In most cases, federal TANF funds are 
forbidden to recipients who have received assistance longer 
than two years at a time or five years in all. States are
free to set time limits more strictly, however, and many of
them have done so. Policymakers await with great interest 
the effects of time limits on recipient families, because 
the most likely to be affected by time limits are those 
where labor market participation is highly problematic. 
Long-term welfare recipients typically encounter many 
barriers to employment. The question is how these people 
will survive when time runs out.
As a block grant, TANF provides a fixed annual
appropriation of funds from the federal government to each 
state. States receive a finite amount of federal welfare 
dollars. This funding constraint did not exist until the 
1996 "block-granting" of public assistance. Previously, 
federal dollars were uncapped, allowing states to meet 
unanticipated need. All persons who met the federally- 
prescribed eligibility criteria, most having to do with 
income, were legally entitled to an AFDC benefit. States 
established their own benefit levels, but they could not 
withhold the benefit from an eligible claimant.
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Under AFDC, individuals were entitled to assistance 
indefinitely as long as income and other eligibility 
criteria were met. Certain individuals also received 
guaranteed child-care benefits, while states received 
uncapped federal matching dollars for program expenditures. 
Benefits were guareuiteed to eligible individuals, even in 
recessions and economic downturns. With TANF, the 
individual entitlement to means-tested assistance vanished. 
The 1996 legislation marked the end of a welfare program 
that had been in place since 1935.
TANF ended the individual entitlement to public 
assistance, leaving states free to abandon means testing as 
a basis for eligibility. The legal connection between the 
federal government and the individual transformed into a 
different kind of relationship between individuals and 
their state welfare agencies. States had to develop public 
assistance plans reflecting a sense of Congress that 
welfare should be a short-term, transitional experience, 
but not a way of life. While the termination of the 
individual entitlement was new, state-level attempts to put 
recipients to work were not.
TANF, with its focus on work and sanctions, is 
philosophically similar to WIN. Therefore, the same
13
factors that dampened WIN's effectiveness could occur with 
TANF. With WIN, the main lesson is that more could have 
been done administratively to enhance the impact of welfare 
reform (Nathan 1993). According to Mead (1985, 249), many 
welfare agencies inplemented WIN reluctantly, without 
aggressive enforcement of work requirements. However, even 
if managers had embraced WIN and pressured clients to join 
the labor force, success may not have followed. Chadwin et 
al. (1981) studied 214 WIN demonstrations and found them 
hindered by local environmental factors beyond the control 
of managers.
Even before WIN, the 1962 Amendments to the Social 
Security Act allowed states to experiment with work 
programs. States could receive exemptions, called "1115 
waivers," from federal welfare rules if they could present 
an acceptable alternate plan. While this certainly could 
have turned out to be a significant devolution of power to 
the states, the states did not take advantage right away.
In 1986, however, the Reagan Administration developed a 
strategy to unleash state-level innovation.
The Reageui strategy was presented in December 1986, 
when the Domestic Policy Council (1986, 51) recommended 
creating "the proper climate for innovation by giving
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states the broadest latitude to design and implement 
experiments in welfare policy." This climate for 
innovation appeared when the administration began granting 
waivers for state demonstration projects.
The Secretary of Human Services granted a small number 
of waivers under Reagan, but the strategy gathered momentum 
during the Bush administration (Council of Economic 
Advisers 1997, 3). By 1996, 35 states held major, 
statewide waivers, most imposing sanctions for failure to 
meet work requirements (Council of Economic Advisers 1997, 
3-4). Presidents Bush and Clinton granted the majority of 
these waivers, but the work requirements themselves date 
back to the Kennedy administration. These waivers, their 
associated demonstration projects, emd upbeat evaluations 
performed by the Manpower Development Research Corporation 
(MDRC) helped convince Congress to pass the FSA (Johnson 
and Tafoya 1999, 4; Mead 1997, 115; Schiller and Brasher 
1990, 665; Szanton 1991, 590-602;).
MDRC is a private organization that conducts welfare- 
to-work field experiments. These prominent random 
assignment experiments provided a wealth of information to 
policymakers. MDRC's experimental studies "were a welcome 
departure from previous studies that had been commissioned
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by the states" (Brasher 1994,515). State evaluations often
included only the most employable recipients, thereby
undermining the generalizability of the findings. MDRC
studies more rigorously observed the principle of random
assignment. The MDRC agenda
focuses on one major element of all recent proposals 
to redesign welfare with the goal of encouraging self- 
support and reducing long-term welfare receipt: 
requiring people on welfare to participate in 
employment-directed services (Gueron and Pauly 1991,
5) .
MDRC evaluations of this "work first" approach, which 
seeks to match clients with unsubsidized employment as 
quickly as possible, indicate that a mixed strategy is most 
effective (Brown 1997, 2-3). Programs showed better 
results when a full range of services and work activities 
were made available. Both the carrot (support services) 
and the stick (mandatory participation) were effective. 
Success required "a commitment of adequate resources to 
serve the full meuidatory population (and) enforcement of 
participation requirements" (Brown 1997, 4) .
MDRC's findings are corrplex. Gueron and Pauly (1991, 
24-35) report
• high peurticipation rates among the targeted people 
in the broad-coverage programs ;
16
• low participation rates overall, usually falling 
short of the rate prescribed by JOBS;
• modest earnings gains that would be insufficient to 
move many people out of poverty;
• favorable cost-benefit results in San Diego, where 
every dollar spent saved the government $3 ; and,
• less favorable cost-benefit results with the more 
expensive programs, suggesting a "diminishing 
returns" effect.
Critics point to several problems with the MDRC 
evaluations. Friedlander and Hurtless (1994, 32) note that 
approaches differed across cities. What worked in San 
Diego or Riverside did not work in Baltimore, Oakland or 
Los Angeles. JOBS evaluations did show that clients can be 
pushed into JOBS without too much difficulty; however, 
earnings remain very low and long-term self-sufficiency is 
by no means the norm (Friedlander emd Burtless 1994, 33) .
According to Brasher (1994, 515-16), "the MDRC 
programs are far from what could be construed as a rigorous 
evaluation of mandatory work progprams. " The program 
participation rates were low, and participation was short­
term. In addition, the two- to three-year time horizon for
17
most of the studies did not permit adequate follow-up 
duration. This diminishes what the studies can reveal 
about the least employable clients. Finally, the Hawthorne 
effect came into play because administrators knew their 
programs were being evaluated. Mead (1997, 116) also finds 
fault with the site-based experimental approach, concluding 
that generalizations from the findings are "judgmental at 
best."
Although it was, at the time of its enactment, the 
most ambitious welfare-to-work program in American history, 
JOBS was a somewhat watered-down reform. The FSA allowed 
states to penalize recipients for failing to work or 
participate in work activities. States, for their part, 
were required to get nonexempt people participating in JOBS 
at prescribed rates, which were set at 7 percent in 1990 
and 1991, then 11 percent in 1992 and 1993. Fifteen 
percent participation in JOBS was required by 1994, and 20 
percent by 1995 (U.S. Congress 1990, 619). According to 
Mead (1997, 114), most states enforced the participation 
requirements.
Analysts at the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 
however, did not expect great things from JOBS. In 1990, 
prior to full implementation of JOBS, the CBO projected
18
that "families off AFDC as a result of JOBS" would number 
50,000 by the end of 1993 (U.S. Congress 1990, 618). This 
effect, which equates to roughly 150,000 persons over a 
five-year period when the AFDC population ranged from 11 
million to 14 million, is quite modest.
Glazer (1995, 24) comments on the program's 
"remarkably limited numerical goals' for moving people off 
welfare. Nathan (1993) lists rising state budgets and the 
national recession as constraints limiting the states' 
response to JOBS. Many states had a hard time finding the 
money necessary to maximize federal matching funds 
available under FSA. Because of such constraints, in an 
average month from 1991 to 1993, JOBS served only about 11 
percent of AFDC parents (U.S. General Accounting Office
1994, 2). This is not encouraging, because the success of 
JOBS is dependent on the participation of recipients (Mead
1995, 9).
Nevertheless, most observers consider the JOBS program 
a serious effort to move recipients off assistance rolls 
(Jennings euid Krane 1994, 343; Marshall and Kamarck 1993, 
226; Pavetti et al., 1996). FSA required individuals to 
participate in work or work-related activities in exchange 
for continued assistance. States were required to provide
19
basic and secondary education, English as a Second Language 
programs, job skills training, job development and 
placement and job readiness. States were also required to 
offer at least two of the following work activities: job 
search, on-the-job-training, work supplementation, or the 
community work experience program. Perhaps these programs 
provided the proper incentives, or eased work transitions, 
for thousands of recipients. Perhaps they did not. The 
aggregate effect of JOBS on AFDC recipiency remains an open 
question.
Schiller emd Brasher (1990) point out that even the 
threat of a work requirement may have a significant 
deterrent effect on potential recipients. When viewed as 
an attempt to alter incentives for single mothers, the work 
requirement inspired optimism about reducing public 
assistance rolls. Positive effects may also be realized by 
assisting individuals entering the workforce. Researchers 
at the Urbeui Institute report that the JOBS program had 
been well-utilized in at least six states as a meems of 
delivering specialized services to job-seekers facing 
personal employment challenges (Pavetti et al. 1996, 2).
During the last decade, a cottage industry of welfare 
research has sought to enumerate the successes cuid failures
20
of reform initiatives. The sheer volume of research on 
welfare reform indicates the practical utility of 
evaluating JOBS. Policymakers and welfare departments want 
to know if the "work" strategy works. This practical 
utility of welfare research is obvious. Perhaps less 
obvious is the fact that welfare reform provides an 
opportunity to evaluate social science theories in the 
context of a conpelling political discourse.
Theorists
Welfare research is about the here and now, no doubt. 
However, evaluating welfare policy also lets the researcher 
evaluate important theoretical traditions. This study, for 
example, evaluates two major theoretical perspective vis-a- 
vis welfare participation. The effects of work 
requirements can be estimated within a model of AFDC 
participation that draws from the developmental and 
rational choice perspectives.
Many social scientists display an enduring interest in 
the causes of variation in welfare caseloads. These 
scholars desire a theory of welfare participation, or at 
least theoretical guidance in sorting out the evidence. 
Enqpirical evidence is inconclusive, so far, as to whether 
JOBS held down AFDC caseloads; so, what does theory
21
suggest?
A structural view suggests that reforms like the FSA 
make little difference in the war against poverty. The 
societal pathologies associated with modernization and 
economic maturity are not likely to bend to the will of 
policymakers. On the other hand, an individualistic 
interpretation of poverty leaves room for the possibility 
that policies can affect behavior. Rational choice theory 
suggests that transforming the behavior of individuals is 
not only possible (through the manipulation of incentive 
structures), but is potentially the key to reducing the 
welfare rolls.
Theorists in the so-called "modernization" tradition 
would be skeptical of JOBS, while rational choice scholars 
would be more optimistic about the program's effect on 
welfare caseloads. Theoretical tension arises from these 
opposite expectations of JOBS's impact on AFDC. Still, 
there have been no systematic attempts to assess the 
efficacy of JOBS in a broad context over time. This is 
somewhat surprising, since favoreible evaluations of JOBS 
would validate the rational choice perspective euid, at the 
same time, buttress political support for the work 
requirements contained in PRWORA.
22
In. Chapter 2, theoretical underpinnings of this 
research are explored in three sections. Chapter 2 
describes the modernization perspective and explores 
Western conceptions of social rights. A structural 
interpretation of social phenomena relates directly to 
welfare participation in the American states. In theory, 
the more "modem" jurisdictions embrace the idea of social 
rights more readily. Gronbjerg's (1977, 8-17) "mass 
societies" perspective emphasizes economic development and 
modernization as indirect determinants of AFDC caseload 
size, and provides in^ortant theoretical guidance in 
modeling caseload variation.
Following a different tradition, rational choice 
scholars proceed from the assumption that individuals weigh 
alternatives before choosing public assistance. Chapter 2 
also esqplores the implications of rational choice theory, 
and offers an economic interpretation of public assistance. 
Together with the developmental perspective, assumptions 
about individual behavior, rationality and self-interest 
provide a general blueprint for modeling welfare 
participation rates.
Rational choice theory has also been applied to state 
policy decisions. Case et al. (1989, 26), for example.
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find that a state government's level of per capita welfare 
expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the 
expenditure levels of its neighbors. Tweedie (1994, 667) 
finds that "low benefit states respond to other states' 
benefits by increasing their own benefit levels." The 
rational behavior of states can be characterized as policy 
diffusion (Collier and Messick 1975), convergence (Bennett
1991) or borrowing (Rose 1991). In any case, the 
rationality of states has prompted investigations into the 
possibility of a "race to the bottom" in welfare benefits. 
It is appropriate, therefore, to include interstate policy 
influences in the discussion of rational choice.
The ultimate purpose in defining a theoretical 
framework is to square these theoretical traditions with 
the economic and political realities of the late twentieth 
century. Welfare policy should be informed by analyses 
that explicitly address connections between theory and 
practice. These connections, which exist in the world of 
welfare, are important because they materially affect 
people's lives. This final justification for evaluating 
work and welfare is perhaps the most important from the 
point of view of a welfare recipient. If the work 
requirements associated with the 1988 reform have not
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significantly affected AFDC participation rates, then 
increased reliance upon "work" as an antidote to welfare 
may be justifiable in theory only.
Welfare Recipients
The purpose behind welfare reform is to reduce or 
eliminate evils that have become part of the system. These 
evils have been lamented in a voluminous academic 
literature. A handy symbol of welfare reform in the 
American states can be found in Mandate for Change 
(Marshall and Schram 1993), President-elect Bill Clinton's 
policy blueprint. Clinton and his Democratic Leadership 
Council (DLC) rejected the old Left-Right dichotomy in 
favor of a politically promising centrist agenda. Part of 
the centrism involved addressing old welfare problems in 
new ways. It was apparently the right time for Democrats 
to agree with Republicans that government was part of the 
problem.
The new consensus enphasized "mutual obligation" and 
"reciprocal responsibilities" (Reischauer 1987, 4).
Iirqplicit in the new consensus is a belief that single 
mothers alter their behavior in response to welfare 
policies. According to this perspective, an individual 
decision to receive public assistance is a "rational
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choice" based on calculations of self-interest {Friedman 
1962; Lampman 1965; Tobin 1965). During the 1960s, for 
exanple, Medicaid attracted large numbers of single parents 
to the AFDC rolls (Albritton 1979; Blank 1989; Moffitt
1992) . The 1996 reform reflects a "rational choice" 
perspective, eitphasizing personal responsibility and work,
Clinton's New Democrat welfare critique speaks in 
unison with William Julius Wilson, Lawrence Mead, and other 
conservatives. As Teles (1998) demonstrates, there is a 
strong consensus among liberals and conservatives about the 
evils of the old welfare system. Welfare was too 
expensive. Eligibility rules penalized marriage and 
rewarded out-of-wedlock births. Work was not encouraged. 
People became trapped in a culture of poverty and a cycle 
of dependency. Mandate for Change prefaces recommendations 
with these "four failures" of policy. The recommendations 
sound almost exactly like TANF, albeit three years early.
Chapter 10 of the Clinton blueprint is called 
Replacing Welfare with Work (Marshall and Kamarck 1993, 
217-236). The Clinton strategy is organized into four 
themes, articulating a shift from income maintenance to 
individual empowerment.
First, welfare reform should make work pay. The
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proposal was far-reaching. Instead of paying people to
stay on welfare, the plan advocated a comprehensive
strategy to transfer welfare expenditures away from
traditional public assistance payments. Wage supplements
were extolled as a means to make work pay, "so that
recipients will not be worse off if they take a job" (p.
228). Forcing an end to welfare entitlements suggested the
need for public employers of last resort. Making work pay
also involved other strategies. Rounding out the plan were
proposals for expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit,
universal access to health care, coordination with private
sector employers, and the encouragement of private
enterprise and private home ownership among the working
poor (pp. 229-31).
Second, reform should strengthen families and assure
child support. As the following paragraph indicates, the
proposal bluntly associates welfare receipt with behavior
patterns of the underclass.
The breakdown of families, though not exclusively a 
problem of the poor, lies at the heart of the self- 
defeating patterns of behavior that help perpetuate 
the urban underclass. The poverty rate for families 
headed by single mothers is six times that of two- 
parent families. Social reseeurchers have found strong 
correlations between single-parent families and high 
rates of crime, teen-age pregnancy, geuig membership, 
and welfare dependency (Marshall emd Karmack 1993,
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This mix of images suggested to Clinton's team a need for 
stiffer child support enforcement and the removal of 
disincentives to marry. According to this logic, mothers 
who feel free to marry are a step closer to self- 
sufficiency.
Third, welfare reform "should stress community 
initiative and eitpower the poor, not the social service 
providers" (Marshall and Karmack 1993, 231). The DLC's 
advocacy of "reinventing government," particularly looking 
away from bureaucratic rigidity, fits welfare reform. 
Mandate for Change proposed a transfer of power from social 
service bureaucrats to business leaders. Vouchers for 
programs like child care, home health care, employment 
training, care for the disabled, and counseling were 
proposed as a way to open up the social services to 
competition from private sector providers. This proposal 
critiques welfare professionals with the same "reinventing 
government" scrutiny that has visited virtually every 
public endeavor. It espouses an enabling strategy that 
"encourage(s) businesses to enter the market for social 
provision* (Marshall and Karmack 1993, 232). The message 
is that all elements of the old system have been corrupted.
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and cannot have a place in the new system.
Finally, welfare reform should "buttress America's 
basic values, especially reciprocal responsibility"
(Marshall and Karmack 1993, 233). The two-year time limit 
was described as "a first and critical step toward ending 
welfare as a way of life" (p. 229) . Entitlements were to 
have no place in the new world of individual 
responsibility. As Cox (1998b) has observed, the receipt 
of benefits is now frequently conditioned upon behaviors.
So welfare receipt is now conditional, depending on 
"recipients' willingness to work and strive toward self- 
sufficiency" (Marshall and Karmack 1993, 233). The 
assun^tion underlying a new enqphasis on personal 
responsibility would appear to be that people are on 
welfare because they are irresponsible.
The goal these reform methods reveal seems obvious—  
caseload reduction. Caseload reduction assures us that we 
are helping people out of dependency. We don't want people 
on welfare; we want them off welfare and in jobs, both for 
their own good and for the benefit of society. But what 
can be done to reduce caseloads? One potential strategy 
involves work requirements. Mead (1995, 4-7) finds that 
JOBS had a significant negative effect on caseloads in a
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cross-sectional analysis of the fifty states. Mead 
correctly points out, however, that a better test of JOBS 
would incorporate a time dimension (p. 5).
Freeing the poor from a perverse and pathological 
welfare system is good for the poor, and for everyone else. 
Reform methods aim more at caseload reduction than at 
anything else. States are required to reduce caseloads, 
not to devise innovative ways of delivering comprehensive 
social services. The standard against which welfare 
reforms must be compared is obvious— did the reform reduce 
welfare recipiency rates?
The switch from AFDC to TANF reflects a desire to make 
employment relatively attractive by manipulating the costs 
and benefits associated with public assistance. Work 
requirements increase the cost of being on welfare; time 
limits reduce the benefit. While it is possible that work 
requirements and time limits will spur some single mothers 
up from dependency, these policies could also harm social 
service clients.
State innovation under TANF opens the door to policies 
that cam affect faunilies positively or negatively.
Copeland and Meier (1987), for example, show that WIC and 
Medicaid have reduced infemt mortality rates; but Meier and
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Holbrook (1991) find diminished effects in states where 
federal funding for the programs was not aggressively 
pursued, Garfinkel et al. (1994) conclude that a properly 
functioning child support collection system would 
significantly reduce child poverty. These studies 
demonstrate that policies, particularly state policies 
involving social service clients, affect family health and 
well-being. Policies carry consequences. This fact 
compels us to evaluate welfare reform.
The most important question for policymakers following 
a shift to TANF is its effect on welfare caseloads. If 
time limits and work requirements associated with JOBS 
slowed the growth in caseloads, TANF may succeed in lifting 
parents up from dependency. Recognizing, however, that 
other potential consequences run counter to the traditional 
social service goals, state legislatures are devoting 
substantial effort and resources to systematic evaluations 
of their TANF programs. The results are mixed.
The Urban Institute supports ongoing research into the 
effects of welfare reform. Acs et al. (1998, 3-5) review 
several findings related to work outcomes:
1) as a family moves from no work to part-time work at 
minimum wage, its total income grows dramatically;
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2) as a family moves from part-time work to full-time 
work at minimum wage, its total income grows by 20 
percent, on average;
3) as a family moves from full-time work at minimum 
wage to full-time work at 9 dollars an hour, its 
total income grows by 16 percent, on average;
4) the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is 
responsible for a considerable portion of the 
increase in income as families move from welfare to 
full-time minimum wage work;
5) federal housing assistance can also affect work 
incentives, but only 20 percent of families on cash 
assistance receive housing aid;
6) in the absence of subsidies, the cost of child care 
could serve as a significant deterrent to work;
7) research has shown that the loss of Medicaid 
benefits upon leaving AFDC was a significemt 
deterrent to leaving welfare; and,
8) lifetime time limits on the receipt of TANF 
benefits provide an incentive to leave welfare for 
work.
It seems cleeu: that working can improve a family's 
situation. However, we still don't know if work
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requirements get people working.
Welfare reform may reduce the rolls and put people to 
work, but TANF is difficult to evaluate statistically, at 
the aggregate level, at this early time. Scholars and 
human service professionals eagerly await time-limit 
evaluations, which might appear within the next few years.
Of equal interest is the effect of the work component.
TANF's work requirement is patterned after the 1988 policy. 
In order to understand the potential effects of TANF's work 
requirements, an investigation of the effectiveness of the 
1988 JOBS program is warranted. This research examines 
aggregate results from JOBS, which has now run its course 
as a national program.^ Before embarking on the analysis, 
however, it is useful to review the research of Lawrence 
Mead. Like the MDRC studies. Mead's analyses are taken 
seriously by policymakers.
JOBS and AFDC Participation: The Work of Lawrence Mead 
Mead's analysis of welfare reform in Wisconsin has had 
great influence among policymakers. A 1995 report. The New 
Paternalism in Action, demonstrates a statistically 
significant association between JOBS participation and
 ^Many states retain certain components o f their JOBS programs, as is their prerogative under TANF.
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slower growth in caseloads (Mead 1995, 8). Mead's analysis 
is important, warranting closer attention at this point.
The New Paternalism in Action is in^ortant because of 
Lawrence Mead's stature as a social scientist, and because 
it is a very competent defense of the conservative 
perspective. The influential report begins with a sketch 
of the major issues, which are listed below (from Mead 
1995, 4):
• "The controversy. . .is mostly about the long-term 
recipients, those who stay on welfare more than 
about two years at a stretch."
• "The public would like welfare to provide a brief 
respite to people who, through divorce or 
joblessness, have fallen on hard times; it is 
dismayed to find that, for meuiy, dependency has 
become a way of life."
• "Families become poor and go on welfare because 
mothers have children out of wedlock and do not work 
to support them."
• "These contrasts in lifestyle between the dependent 
and the nondependent drive welfare politics. The 
chief issue is who is responsible for the
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differences and what to do about them."
• "Conservatives blame the disincentives inherent in
welfare, which appear to pay the recipients not to
marry or work."
The new paternalism recognizes two problems—
illegitimacy and failure to work. Of course, everyone
wishes the rate of out-of-wedlock births to fall, but not
much can be done. According to Mead (1995, 4),
the public opposes illegitimacy, [but] is ambivalent 
about combating it because of the required 
intervention in families, nor have policymakers found 
any means to prevent it. Accordingly, the main 
welfare debate has been about employment : why do 
welfare adults seldom work consistently, and what can 
be done to make them do so?
WIN and JOBS symbolize the conservative turn in welfare
politics. Expanding the welfare system is not under
consideration anywhere in the American states. Welfare-to-
work progreuns are part of a strategy to shrink welfare.
But have WIN êuxd JOBS produced anything other than symbols?
Mead says yes.
Mead's (1995, 7-10) analysis uses cross-sectional data
enconpassing the fifty states. He first examines the
bivariate correlation between JOBS participation in 1993
and percent chémge in AFDC caseload from 1989-1993, and
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then explores several other correlations. The JOBS 
participation variable correlates with AFDC caseloads 
negatively and significantly (-.36), indicating an inverse 
relationship between JOBS participation and welfare rolls.
A JOBS expenditure measure also takes a negative sign.
Mead also correlates indicators of other social forces with 
percent changes in caseload size.
Mead measures family structure somewhat indirectly. A 
state's average case size for 1992 correlates negatively 
with percent change in AFDC caseload at a high magnitude {- 
.44). Mead interprets this coefficient as an indication of 
the effect of illegitimacy, "since unwed pregnancy, 
especially among teen mothers, has the effect of bringing a 
lot of new families onto the rolls with only one or two 
children" (p. 7) . Increasing illegitimacy "both raises the 
rolls and lowers the average case size" (Mead 1995, 10). 
Unemployment was positively correlated with AFDC 
participation (.40), as was the AFDC greuit amount (.20). 
Summing up these results. Mead concludes that social forces 
matter, but so does JOBS (p. 8). The analysis then moves 
to a multiple regression in an attempt to control for 
unemployment, race, average caseload size, and percent of 
cases with unearned income (see Teddle 1 below) .
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Table 1. Results from Mead’s Regression
Variable Coefficient Standard
Error
Significance
Percent of welfare adults active in -.892 .327 .009
JOBS. 1991
Change in percent of welfare adults -.927 .470 .054
active, 1991-1993
Percent of welfare adults mandatory in -.398 .217 .073
JOBS, 1993
Percent of cases with unearned income. -.405 .235 .091
1992
Average size of welfare case, 1992 -113 25.9 .000
Change in average case size, 1989- 105 34.5 .004
1992
Percent of caseload black, 1989 -.340 .123 .008
Change in percent of caseload black. -1.96 1.10 .081
1989-1992
Change in unemployment rate, 1989- 3.72 2.21 .099
1993
R-squared .64
Source; Mead ( 1995,9).
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Mead estimates the percent change in AFDC caseload
using nine independent variables, reproduced in Table 1.
The effect from average case size is the strongest, with a
negative coefficient and a probability of Type I error*
below .0001. This is taken as a strong indication that
out-of-wedlock births, which are presumed to decrease the
average case size, spur growth in AFDC caseloads. The
coefficient for change in average case size is positive,
however, unlike the sign for average case size. Mead
(1995, 10) explains this disparity in the following way:
Caseload size. . .grew most in the states that had the 
smallest case size at the start of the period and the 
most caseload growth during it. Apparently, a long­
term condition of high illegitimacy and low case size 
set these states up for a rapid growth in dependency, 
as mothers already on the rolls had additional 
children.
Mead's reasoning is difficult to follow, but we can 
accept his basic assertion that out-of-wedlock births 
increase caseloads. In addition, the coefficient for 
percent of caseload black (-.34) indicates caseloads that 
are getting whiter, üneirployment is positively associated 
with AFDC caseloads, as expected. These contextual 
varicJoles control for influences that exist beyond the
 ^Type I error occurs when a true null hypothesis is erroneously rejected (hfeier and Brudney 1987,160).
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control of policymakers. This technique allows Mead to 
confidently report the significant impact of JOBS.
Of the three JOBS variables shown in Table 1, only one 
reaches the .05 level of significance. All take negative 
signs, but the significant effect is from the JOBS 
participation measure (p < .01). Mead estimates that a 
percentage point increase in the proportion of AFDC adults 
active in JOBS in 1991 is associated with a .892 decrease 
in the percent change in AFDC caseloads from 1989 to 1993. 
According to Mead (1995, 10), "This implies that states 
that had high participation early in JOBS, or under WIN, 
had a leg up on controlling their caseloads." This 
negative coefficient for JOBS is important because it 
indicates that work requirements reduce caseloads. But 
Mead's analysis is not conclusive.
Mead (1995, 10) admits to limitations inherent in his 
study.
Strictly speaking, these results show only that JOBS 
helps explain variations in welfare growth across the 
states. To prove that JOBS restrained growth in AFDC 
nationwide would take a different analysis. One 
showing that JOBS changed conditions in the whole 
national caseload over time....One would like to add 
to this analysis more indicators of social and 
economic conditions within a state.
It is the purpose of this research to take up Mead's
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challenge. This analysis adds the time element Mead 
recommends by analyzing all years from 1984 to 1996. State 
variation is also incorporated in a pooled cross-sectional 
time-series data set that "stacks" fifty time series. As 
Mead asserts, a true test of JOBS must account for 
variation in AFDC participation across both space and time.
Conclusion
Mead's data show a negative correlation between state
variation in JOBS participation with state variation in
AFDC caseloads. Based on Mead's findings, one might expect
JOBS participation to be associated (negatively) with AFDC
participation even in a properly specified model. On the
other hand, even Mead (1997, 69) acknowledges uncertainty
regarding the effects of JOBS.
Most of what is )cnown about the effects of welfare 
work progreuns comes from the MDRC evaluations, but 
these mostly date from the 1980s and cover only a 
handful of sites. MDRC has a national study of JOBS 
under way at several sites, but it is still 
unfinished.
Moreover, conclusive evaluations are not likely to appear 
cuiy time soon. To many welfare officials the question is 
moot as long as caseloads keep falling. Also, evaluations 
are less likely under PRWORA because the block grant frees 
states from the need for waivers. Evaluations in
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Wisconsin, for exairple, were undertaken to obtain waivers, 
not to assist decision makers, who care less about the 
actual effects of work programs. Add to these dynamics the 
problems of evaluating people who (a) exit the rolls, and 
(b) are diverted from joining the rolls. These people are 
affected by work programs, but this population is very 
difficult to identify, measure and analyze. For these 
reasons, state work initiatives have not been well 
evaluated.
Additional uncertainty about JOBS stems from the fact 
that it was not enthusiastically implemented. As Mead 
(1997, 68-9) points out, it was more likely under JOBS for 
a welfare recipient to be non-working and not involved in 
an employment program. Nathan (1993, 121) agrees that 
iitplementation of JOBS fell short. JOBS work supports, 
including transitional Medicaid and child care benefits, 
were not provided on a large scale to working poor 
families.
So we really don't know what to expect from a 
quantitative analysis of JOBS. Mead found a significant 
negative effect, but he did not incorporate a time 
dimension or control adequately for other influences. Will 
his finding survive more rigorous testing? Will the
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estimate of JOBS' intact on AFDC participation rates take a 
negative sign and achieve statistical significance?
The expectation here is for a negative effect on AFDC 
participation, as was found by Mead. Could the sign be 
positive? Is it possible that JOBS participation swells 
the rolls? This is not likely unless JOBS programs came 
with benefits attached. Perhaps the prospect of training 
and child-care induced parents to stay on AFDC instead of 
exiting. This seems unlikely. Since these support 
services were not implemented on a large scale, they 
probably did not coax parents onto AFDC. Therefore, a 
negative regression coefficient is expected. Statistical 
significance, however, is not as likely in this analysis.
Two factors reduce the likelihood that JOBS had a 
significant impact. First, the program was not implemented 
fully. A partially implemented design is less likely to 
achieve its purpose. In addition to the weakness of JOBS, 
one can point to the strength of unpredictable forces that 
endlessly frustrate policymakers. When a model of AFDC 
participation is properly specified, the resulting 
regression equation is more likely to attribute variation 
in AFDC participation to forces other than JOBS.
Estimation of a multiple regression model of AFDC
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participation is the focus of Chapter 3. Theoretical 
constructs explicated in Chapter 2, namely modernization, 
rational self-interest, and government policies are 
operationalized. Modernization is captured by income and 
family structure variables. Rational choice is measured in 
terms of benefits and wages. Interstate influences are 
captured indirectly by a "spatial lag" term summarizing 
AFDC participation in surrounding states. The policy of 
interest is the JOBS program. Although we are interested 
primarily in estimating the effects of the JOBS program, 
the regression equation also permits an exploration of more 
general theoretical issues in social science.
The "Mass Societies" perspective emphasizes economic 
development and modernization as indirect determinants of 
AFDC caseload size. A rational choice perspective proceeds 
from the assumption that individuals weigh alternatives 
before choosing public assistance. The literature provides 
some support for both perspectives, but they generate 
opposite expectations of programs like JOBS. Development 
theory would not predict a significant effect from JOBS, 
but rational choice theory would (under the right 
circumstances).
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A statistical model of AFDC recipiency allows one to 
examine the effect of work requirements within the context 
of other influences. Results from the analysis are 
presented in Chapter 4, with an accompanying discussion 
addressing the theoretical tension between development and 
rational choice perspectives. The final chapter revisits 
the practitioner, the theorist and the recipient.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE SOCIAL RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 
Two research questions are addressed in this study. 
First, do policies in general have a measurable impact on 
welfare participation? Specifically, did the JOBS program 
have a measuraüale impact on AFDC participation? These 
questions are best addressed from a broad perspective that 
frames public assistance in terms of social rights. This 
perspective incorporates several views concerning the 
problem of accounting for welfare fluctuations. While it 
recognizes the importance of self-interest, the social 
rights perspective flows out of development theory.
Industrialization created new social, economic and 
political realities that made inequality the focus of 
organized protest. Social rights became important to 
organized interest groups when industrialization replaced 
agriculture at the center of commerce (Lane 1993, 317) .
The social rights framework, which stems from modernization 
theory, has helped political scientists account for the 
expansion of the welfare rolls in Western nations.
According to various observers (Briggs 1985, 206; Marshall 
1964, 102; Wolfe 1989, 113), the expansion of social rights 
has coincided with an expansion of public assistance
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programs. The central idea guiding this research is that 
the strength of commitment to social rights affects the 
scope of welfare programs. This plays out in different 
ways, because commitments vary in strength across 
jurisdictions and across time.
The concept of social rights allows us to think about 
a welfare state that can not only expand, but also 
contract. This is because social rights themselves, as 
they have evolved, can vary to a greater degree than was 
once imagined. By keeping an eye on social rights, we can 
determine when development theory applies and when rational 
choice theory is the dominant approach. With welfare 
reform, the theory in play is rational choice.
Development theory says little about shrinking welfare 
states, whereas the rational choice perspective is more 
appliccüDle in the reform era. When social rights were 
being won, development theory explained rising caseloads. 
When social rights lose political ground, development 
theory explains little. Instead, another mechanism for the 
falling caseloads must be identified. Welfare reform 
employs the logic of rational choice theory on two 
different levels—personal responsibility and state-level 
flexibility. A new incentive structure in^osed on the
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states is leading them to manipulate recipient incentive 
structures to encourage employment. States must now 
calculate what their neighboring states will do, and what 
low-income mothers will do, under different circumstances.
This amalysis includes the fifty American states 
measured on a set of variables annually from 1984 to 1996. 
Cross-state variation is probably attributable to 
development, while recent year-to-year variation is more 
likely the product of rational choice dynamics. In 
addition to developmental differences and varying incentive 
structures, the federal character of the American welfare 
state also influences welfare participation. Devolution is 
being used as a mechanism for altering the content of 
social rights. The remainder of this chapter pulls 
developmental eind rational choice perspectives into focus 
under the lens of social rights.
The next section of this chapter discusses development 
theory and social rights in historical context. Next, the 
Americcua welfare state is exsunined in comparative 
perspective. This middle section of the chapter describes 
the rise and fall of social rights in the United States.
The fourth section explores the iirplications of rational 
choice theory, to include self-interest calculations made
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at both state and individual levels. These calculations 
become more determinative of welfare participation when the 
content of social rights dissipates. The concluding 
section describes the utility of the social rights 
perspective.
Development and Social Rights 
The expcuasion of the welfare state has guided a 
considerable amount of social science research (Briggs 
1985; Heclo 1974; Marshall 1964; Roche 1992; Taylor-Gooby 
1994; Titmuss 1974; Weir and Skocpol 1983; Wolfe 1989). In 
their analyses of the boom period in AFDC (late 1960s and 
early 1970s), Isaac and Kelly (1981, 1982) review the 
development perspective as it pertains to public 
assistance. This perspective views welfare expansion as a 
linear progression through sequential phases.
Development theory can be traced to Wagner's ([1883] 
1958) law of expanding state activity. Social, economic, 
and demographic changes brought on by modernization create 
dislocations in society. People without adequate skills or 
education fail to keep up with new economic realities. 
Poverty increases as modernization leaves some people 
behind. These new economics, however, lead to an economic 
surplus from which support for social programs can be
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drawn. Welfare states thus arise from the increased 
dislocations among certain groups and the expanded economic 
capacity of modernized states (Flora and Alber 1981, 38- 
44) .
In modernized states, the capacity to finance welfare 
should be greater; but development has a down side as well. 
Extremely poor states have higher levels of need, and would 
show high participation rates as well. When we consider 
the poor states, it might be helpful to graphically sketch 
the relationship between need and welfare. Figure 2 shows 
the hypothesized relationship between state per capita 
income and AFDC recipiency. Note the decreasing welfare 
rolls as wealth increases in the poor states, compared with 
the opposite effect in wealthy states.
The social processes that generate wealth also 
generate poor people. Since the distribution of increased 
wealth falls unevenly, poverty is often found alongside 
great wealth. The visibility of poverty moves people to 
expeuid welfare programs in the interest of altruism. The 
political threat posed by an expeuiding underclass can also 
motivate e^^ansions of welfare programs to larger 
proportions of the population.
4 9
STATE WEALTH
Figure 2. The Hypothesized Curvilinear Relationship between 
State Wealth and AFDC Participation
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The actual bivariate relationship between mean per 
capita income (mean for 1984-1996) and mean AFDC 
participation (again, for all years) is depicted in Figure 
3. Each data point represents a state. The graph shows 
that the curvilinear relationship between development and 
public assistance is apparent at the bivariate level. Even 
without controlling for other factors, the data show higher 
rates of AFDC recipiency in the poorest and wealthiest 
states. A positive slope for the poverty indicator would 
also be consistent with the mass societies perspective.
A positive slope for poverty would indicate that need 
also stimulates higher levels of welfare participation. As 
the poverty rate increases, the AFDC participation rate 
should increase. This expectation comports with 
Gronbjerg's (1977) mass society framework. We would also 
expect increased per capita income, a measure of capacity, 
to be associated with larger caseloads. So, increases in 
both poverty (need) euid wealth (capacity) should lead to 
the expansion of public assistance.
The rise of industrial capitalism led memy polities to 
the conclusion that poverty was structural. Modem 
industrial economies were subject to unpredictable shifts
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that threw many innocent people into dire circumstances. 
Public assistance during times of need was viewed as an 
appropriate remedy for some adverse effects of capitalism. 
The expansion of the welfare state in the Western world was 
one response to inequalities brought on by 
industrialization (Bendix 1969, 5).
T. H. Marshall (1964, 102) attributes the rise of the 
state role in public welfare to an extension of citizenship 
rights.
The extension of social services is not primarily a 
means of equalizing incomes. . .What matters is that 
there is a general enrichment of the concrete 
substance of civilized life, a general reduction of 
risk and insecurity, an equalization between the more 
and the less fortunate at all levels— between the 
healthy and the sick, the employed and the unemployed, 
the old and the active, the bachelor and the father of 
a large family.
The idea of "citizenship rights" refers to "the extension
of civil, political and social rights in Western industrial
societies during the last two hundred years" (King 1987,
164)
According to Stein Rokkan's theory of European 
political development (1974), welfare states arose in the
 ^"Civil rights” refers primarily to legal rights (e g., rights o f the accused), while "political rights" refers to 
democratic participation.
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last of four sequential stages.® The first stage is state 
formation, where fiscal and military structures are 
established. This stage is characterized by unification at 
the elite level, along with the creation of tax 
bureaucracies for resource mobilization, armies for 
consolidation of the territory and police to maintain 
internal order.
The second stage is called nation building. During 
this phase of development, we see the establishment of 
connections between the elite and the peripheral 
population. This is achieved with conscript armies, 
schools and standardization of language. Mass media and 
religion are also standardized. This phase, like the one 
before it, carries the goals and values of the center out 
into the periphery, subjecting the scattered population to 
military, economic and cultural control. The next phases 
of development, by contrast, are manifestations of the 
periphery's response to subjugation by the center.
The third stage of development witnesses political 
participation and the establishment of citizenship. Mass 
democracies develop as political equality is built on a
' The summary o f Rokkan’s theory draws heavily from Flora and Alber (1981.45-46).
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foundation of rights. Legislative institutions and
electoral mechanisms are established, as are political
parties. In the participation phase, citizenship is
secured by the peripheral population. The fourth phase
then gives definition and content to citizenship.
The final stage of development is called
redistribution. Redistribution is a mechanism for
equalizing economic conditions, involving the establishment
of public welfare systems, progressive taxation, and
transfer payments. The development of a welfare state
establishes social citizenship through the redistribution
of money, goods and other benefits (e.g., health care,
education or housing) . The growth of welfare states is
thus dependent on the development of mass democracies. One
implication of this relationship is variation in welfare
systems originating from differences in how these mass
democracies took shape.
Asa Briggs (1985, 177-211) calls attention to the
historical considerations underpinning the idea of the
"welfare state." First among these considerations is modem
political economy. According to Briggs (1985, 183),
The conception of market forces sets the problems of 
the welfare state (euid of welfare) within the context 
of the age of modem political economy. In societies
55
without market economies, the problem of welfare 
raises quite different issues. Within the context of 
the age of modem political economy an attenç>t has 
been made, and is still being made, to create and 
maintain a self-regulating system of markets.
When a state tries to maintain a self-regulating system of
markets, however, distress follows. The decline of
laissez-faire economic policy euid the rise of socialism in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were
products of a reaction against liberal economics.
The second historical consideration, which follows
from the first, is the existence of chronic uneitployment.
Chronic unemployment, which can be structural (long-term)
or cyclical (short-term), prompted organized labor groups
to work for the recognition of social rights for workers.
In the interwar years, memories of chronic unemployment
existed alongside a belief that governments could do
something about it. Indeed, it was in the interest of
governments to avoid the political fallout from economic
hardship and labor unrest.
The third historical consideration, social activism,
refers to the response of organized labor to chronic
unemployment. According to Friedman (1981, 15), "welfare
statism is the twentieth century's response to the demands
of citizens—however articulated—for material protection
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from contingencies that are beyond their privately 
organized capacity to avoid." Although these demands were 
addressed in varying degrees, depending on the country, the 
possibility of using the state to correct market 
deficiencies existed in all industrial democracies. Social 
activism led to government intervention.
The fourth consideration pertaining to welfare state 
development involves the range of social services. In 
Britain, for example, public health issues fell within the 
agreed range of government action, but the regulation of 
personal health services did not. In the United States 
there has been controversy about which services the 
government should provide, who should receive them, and how 
they should be provided. Different nations have developed 
different welfare philosophies.
Variation across nations, according to Briggs (1985), 
carries three different kinds of welfare states along three 
different trajectories. This variation in efforts to 
modify the effects of market forces is the fifth historical 
consideration. The first approach to state intervention 
guarantees individuals and families a minimum income. The 
second approach seeks to ameliorate the insecurity 
associated with sickness, old age, unemployment euid other
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crises. Finally, the third approach tries to ensure that 
"all citizens without distinction of status or class are 
offered the best standards available in relation to a 
certain range of agreed social services" (Briggs 1985,
183). This third direction reflects an idea of social 
rights that reaches for the highest level of economic, 
social and political equality among citizens.
Through the post-War period to the 1960s, conceptions 
of social rights held fast in most Western democracies. 
Still, there was variation in commitment. Social rights 
were anchored most firmly in Social-Democratic nations like 
Sweden. The comprehensive and generous benefits found in 
Scandinavian states reflect enduring commitments to social 
rights.
The welfare state that is founded on conceptions of 
social rights is more likely to maintain its commitment to 
social service recipients. However, unlike civil cuid 
political rights, social "rights" appear to be actual 
rights only in certain places at certain times. As Cox 
(1998a, 398-399) observes, many European countries are 
retooling welfare policies as part of a shift away from 
"rights" as the basis of welfare.
5 8
As rights become more entrenched, using the language 
of rights to legitimate welfare benefits makes those 
benefits more easily defensible. In recent years, 
however, there is a growing dissatisfaction with the 
proliferation of rights. In addition, it has become 
more expensive to satisfy rights claims (p. 398).
This evolution in how we think about social rights has lead
to far-reaching policy changes in Western industrialized
democracies.
When a basic subsistence income is no longer thought 
of as a right, it must be thought of as something else.
For example, a welfare check can be thought of as 
consideration for the performance of a contract. On the 
other hand, it can be thought of as a settlement, the 
product of a negotiation between two parties who feel they 
must deal with each other. The welfare check that is based 
on a contract is less certain than one based in a right, 
because its disbursement is dependent upon performance of 
something in consideration. If welfare is thought of as 
the product of a negotiation, the arrangement can be 
canceled. When poor people are entitled to economic 
assistance because of a society's commitment to social 
rights, the scope of welfare is less likely to be narrowed 
by policymakers.
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Variable commitments to social rights produce 
variation in welfare policies. Esping-Andersen (1990, 26- 
7) outlines three categories of welfare states reflecting 
three different levels of commitment to social rights.’ The 
United States is placed the "liberal" category, where 
social rights are barely recognized at all. This weak 
commitment to social rights helps to explain why the United 
States does not maintain the level of welfare generosity 
that exists in Sweden.
Social Rights and the American Welfare State 
Although the success of labor movements made possible 
the perpetuation of several expansive welfare states in 
Europe, ideological and moral contradictions contributed to 
a different context for the American welfare state. Social 
rights are viewed differently in countries with well- 
preserved liberal traditions. Ideologies that elevate the 
market to primacy are not necessarily conducive to workers' 
rights. The United States is a particularly good excutple 
of a market-oriented liberal welfare state (Esping-Andersen 
1990). This section traces the fate of social rights in
’ Esping-Andersen’s typolo^ o f welfaie-slaie regimes is routinely cited in cross-national studies of welfare 
policy (e.g., Hicks and Swank 1992.659-60; Howard 1993.404; Ruggie 1996.16; and Wealherley 1994. 
153).
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the United States, where con^licating factors include 
ideology, race and federalism.
Esping-Andersen (1990, 2) takes a broad approach to 
welfare, including in his analysis "issues of employment, 
wages, and overall macro-economic steering" as integral 
components of a "Keynesian welfare state." Surveying 
cross-national variation in social rights, Esping-Andersen 
finds welfare states clustered. Three clusters, or 
"regimes-types," describe eighteen capitalist democracies 
throughout Europe, North America, Australia and Asia.® The 
key to the clusters lies in the level of "de­
commodification" present.
In the language of Esping-Andersen (1990, 21-2), 
social rights entail the de-commodification of labor. In 
capitalist societies, markets "become universal" and render 
individuals dependent on cash for survival. Capitalism 
effectively confined social production to within the 
confines of the labor contract, thereby trcuisforming labor 
into a commodity. Social rights advocates recognize this 
adverse effect and strive to correct it through de-
'  The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany. Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United 
States.
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commodification.
If social rights are given the legal and practical 
status of property rights, if they are inviolable, and 
if they are granted on the basis of citizenship rather 
than performance, they will entail a de­
commodification of the status of individuals vis-à-vis 
the market (Esping-Andersen 1990, 21).
De-commodification is a high priority for labor because
commodification is market-dependence. De-commodification
is opposed by eirployers because it entails paying workers
who don't work. The balance of power between workers and
employers affects the level of de-commodification.
The United States occupies Esping-Andersen's liberal
category, where public assistance is not given in the
spirit of citizenship. AFDC, for example, was a meeuis-
tested benefit tied to demonstrable need, not citizenship.
Meager benefit levels eind stigma reduced the de-
commodifying effect of AFDC, since it provided at best an
unpleasant alternative to personal failure in the labor
market, and only to certain classes of people.
The origin of "welfare" in the United States is
usually traced to 1911. According to Skocpol et al. (1993,
686), the "gremdmother" of AFDC was the "mother's pension"
(or "widow's pension" ) . Based on the assuirqption that these
parents were deserving and wholesome, mother's pensions
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sought to alleviate the problems faced by war widows.
Mother's pensions were "state-level enabling statutes
authorizing local governmental authorities to make regular
payments directly to impoverished mothers (and occasionally
other care-takers) of dependent children" (p. 686). The
rapid enactment of mother's pensions between 1911 and 1930
is best explained, according to Skocpol et al. (1993, 689),
by modernization theory.
Although modernization arguments have been found not 
to apply to the origins of old-age pensions or social 
insurance in the United States as contrasted to Europe 
(Collier and Messick 1975; Flora and Heidenheimer 
1981; Orloff and Skocpol 1984), they nevertheless 
might apply to the intra-U.S. origins of mother's 
pensions, which were intended largely for the "worthy 
widows" cuid children of deceased male breadwinners 
[authors' italics].
In their quantitative model of mother's pension enactment,
Skocpol et al. (1993, 692) find a significant positive
effect from per capita expenditures for public schools,
supporting the notion that more developed states made
welfare a government endeavor sooner.
Skocpol et al. (1993) are concerned with a particular
piece of the welfare puzzle—the effect of mother's groups.
Perhaps because of the relatively high education level
among Americaui women, con^ared to other nations, voluntary
associations were formed in most states just after the turn
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of the century. Educated women could not yet vote, and 
sought to influence policy in other ways. According to 
Baker (1984), these organizations developed to express the 
concerns of mothers, children and families in a new 
industrial economy. They were joined by the American 
Federation of Labor and politicians like Theodore Roosevelt 
and Robert LaFollette in an emergent consensus (Teles 1998, 
29) .
Although a consensus existed on the need to elevate 
poor relief to the state level, that is about as far as 
consensus went. According to Teles (1998, 30), the states 
varied widely on the amount of the benefit or the breadth 
of coverage. In summary, it can be said that the U.S. 
states underfunded the pensions and kept benefits far below 
reasonable standards of need (Skocpol 1992, 472) .
The American welfare state expanded when mother's 
pensions were replaced with the ADC program. Mother's 
pensions were state policies that happened to be enacted in 
every state. ADC was a program forced on the states by the 
federal government in response to the Great Depression.
The expansion of the welfare state is defined by this 
unprecedented federal commitment to public assistance.
In 1935, President Franklin Roosevelt signed the
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Social Security Act. This watershed event responded to 
widespread poverty among the elderly. As one component of 
the Social Security legislation, the Aid to Dependent 
Children (ADC) program was established to assist children 
who were victims of economic collapse and agricultural 
disaster. The enabling legislation permitted states to set 
their own benefit levels, stopping short of rescuing the 
program from the state legislatures. A fully nationalized 
program, without state variation in eligibility or 
benefits, would have enhanced the inviolability of social 
rights. As Huntington (1973) has observed, the extension 
of citizenship rights is hampered by decentralization.
Social rights have remained subject to the vagaries of 
the federalism debate. When welfare policy becomes more 
centralized, as it did in 1935, social rights tend to be 
more firmly enshrined. That is usually a basic purpose of 
centralization— to ensure against deficiencies at the 
subnational level. Centralization of administrative 
capacity is typically regarded as evidence of development 
(e.g.. Flora and Alber 1981, 44).
Federalism has had a detrimental effect on social 
rights in the United States. Despite some degree of 
nationalization of welfare with ADC in 1935, the federal
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system's protections against centralizing forces have kept 
welfare policy largely at the subnational level. States, 
according to Gronbjerg (1977, 11), have "jealously guarded 
their constitutional prerogatives to set policies in areas 
where the constitutional authority does not rest 
exclusively with the national government." The federal 
government itself has been instrumental in preserving state 
control of public assistance. The phenomenon of fiscal 
federalism, symbolized by grants-in-aid to states and 
localities, demonstrates America's inclination toward 
decentralization. In short, federalism has been a barrier 
to the extension of citizenship rights.
As the decades passed, inequities tied to state 
variation became a national concern. Recalcitrant states, 
especially in the South, withheld not only social, but also 
civil and political rights. These inequities led to calls 
for national action. After the assassination of President 
Kennedy in 1963, Lyndon Johnson answered the call.
Dubbed "the Great Society," Johnson's vision of 
equality for Americans became arguably the most inportant 
accomplishment of his presidency. Johnson (1971, 104) 
recalls the era.
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At the heart of it, I thought of the Great Society as 
an extension of the Bill of Rights. When our 
fundamental American rights were set forth by the 
Founding Fathers, they reflected the concerns of a 
people who sought freedom in their time. But in our 
time a broadened concept of freedom requires that 
every American have the right to a healthy body, a 
full education, a decent home, and the opportunity to 
develop to the best of his talents. . . .1 saw it as a 
program of action to clear up an agenda of social 
reform almost as old as this century.
By the 1960s, the structural view of poverty had
evolved into the logic of the Great Society. Poverty was
regarded as "a permanent structural problem— not just a
result of a collapsed economy, but the result of the
capitalistic system itself" (Cammisa 1998, 101). Since it
was impossible to confront the proximate cause of
industrial-era poverty (the capitalistic system), the
expansion of assistance programs made sense. During the
1960s, the persistence of poverty in many states, amid
rising affluence elsewhere, fueled the expansion of AFDC
benefits and liberalization of eligibility requirements
(Levitan 1985, 451). Expanded benefits preceded the
noteworthy surge in the AFDC population between 1967 and
1972 (Teles 1996, 19). The racial demographics of this
surge reflected the anti-poverty goals of the Great
Society.
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According to Piven and Cloward's Regulating the Poor 
(1971), an influential book about the surge in AFDC rolls 
during the 1960s, the welfare expansion of the 1950s was a 
political response to the civil disorder of urban blacks. 
The authors begin by observing that welfare programs have 
not reflected a trend of growing generosity. Instead, 
programs expand and contract as the system performs its two 
main functions " . . .  maintaining civil order and enforcing 
work" (p. X V ) .
Theoretically, political protests and uprisings may 
prompt or force governments to adopt measures to pacify 
potentially rebellious factions. However, as disorder 
subsides, relief does also. Piven and Cloward argue that 
such actions by political elites are a deliberate attempt 
to use welfare to regulate euid manipulate the behavior of 
the poor. Thus, according to Piven and Cloward (1979, 
1012), mass volatility can help explain a series of 
national policy initiatives that contributed to the 
subsequent rise in AFDC rolls occurring in the 1970s.
Piven euid Cloward may be correct in explaining welfare 
variation in terms of regulating the poor. What does this 
say about social rights? Using Piven euid Cloward's logic, 
we would expect social rights to be enhanced at certain
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times, but diminished at certain other times as the 
situation dictates. Social rights of this type are 
discursive to a greater degree than civil and political 
rights. The right to vote is not really up for debate, nor 
is the right to a trial by jury. The content of social 
rights, however, is apparently a product of political 
negotiation. In the late 1960s, social rights found a 
friend in the United States Supreme Court. Teles (1998, 
ch. 6) reviews Court decisions that bolstered social 
rights.
The Supreme Court of the 1960s was predisposed to 
answer "rights" questions because it was seen then as a 
protector of the weak and "the vindicator of rights" (Teles 
1998, 117). Mogull (1993, 261) describes the socio­
economic conditions leading up to the expansion of welfare 
rights in the Americêm states in the late 1960s. The 
modernization of Southern agriculture had displaced many 
farm laborers, causing a migration of African-Americans to 
large cities. High unen^loyment led to political action, 
riots and other forms of civil disorder. In the cities, 
"the growing mass of poor blacks emerged as a political 
force" (Mogull 1993, 261). Local relief institutions 
responded, as did the United States Supreme Court.
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In the decade from 1965 to 1975, a revolution in 
social welfare policy took place (Isaac et al. 1994, 119). 
From a rights perspective, three important decisions were 
handed down in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the 
Supreme Court applied the idea of rights to welfare (Teles 
1998, 99). In a 1968 case, King v. Smith (392 U.S. 309), 
the Court ruled that while the states were free to set need 
standards and benefit levels, eligibility was to be decided 
at the national level.
Protecting eligibility policy from state discretion 
establishes more firmly the "right" to welfare. In 1970, 
Goldberg v. Kelly (397 U.S. 254 [quoted in Teles 1998,
111] ) affirmed that welfare benefits are "a matter of 
statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive 
them. Their termination involves state action that 
adjudicates important rights." In 1971, the Townsend v. 
Swank (404 U.S. 282) decision invoked the Supremacy Clause, 
invalidating any "state eligibility standard that excludes 
persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC 
standards." These cases reveal the Court's willingness to 
accept the arguments of welfare rights advocates.
Within a few years, several studies appeared in 
response to Piven and Cloweird's argument. Not
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surprisingly, tests of the mass insurgency explanation 
produced mixed results. Several articles found the 
approach incomplete (Albritton 1979; Durman 1973). Others 
lend support to the connection between the civil disorder 
of the 1960s and AFDC caseload increases (Betz 1974;
Fording 1997; Hicks and Swank 1983; Isaac and Kelly 1981, 
1982; Jennings 1983) . Still, most scholars, Hicks and 
Swank (1983) in particular, have concluded that the Piven 
and Cloward thesis is useful only during times of civil 
unrest. The mass insurgency thesis may partly explain the 
surge in caseloads in the 1960s and 1970s, but other 
explanations are needed for other eras. The leftist 
politics of the 1960s are a distant memory. The most 
enduring legacy of the mass insurgency era may be the 
backlash against the welfare state that gained full 
momentum in the 1980s.
Welfare reform gained momentum in industrialized 
democracies when economic expansion, and the concomitant 
expansion of social rights, no longer seemed limitless. 
Lasch (1995, 228-230) points to diminishing resources and 
inadequate levels of "racial good will* as indicators of an 
"age of limits* that defies liberal expectations of "an 
indefinite e3q>cmsion of productive forces. " What the era
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of social rights did to strengthen public assistance 
programs, the age of limits presumably is undoing.
One example of thinking in terms of limits rather than 
social rights can be found in the so-called "race to the 
bottom" (Peterson and Rom 1989). The main assumption 
driving the notion that states adjust welfare benefits to 
match benefit levels in other states is that individual 
behaviors are the product of self-interest calculations.
The race to the bottom may be a direct result of post­
industrial realities. The globalization of economic 
competition has forced legislatures to consider 
competitiveness, in all its varied incarnations, more 
carefully. Since welfare policies may be construed as de 
facto labor market policies, they become the focus of self- 
conscious interstate comparison. Whether states actually 
coirpete when setting benefit levels or not, it is 
apparently considered rational to do so. The current 
welfare climate assumes rational behavior from states and 
individuals alike.
Welfare Reform and Rational Choice Theory 
The conservative ascendancy that ushered in the Reagan 
administration espoused an economic interpretation of 
welfare politics. Keynesian economics was out and supply-
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side was in. Government programs and taxes were cut to 
encourage saving, investment and economic growth. Big 
government Lost political support. In this atmosphere, an 
ever-expanding welfare responsibility seemed ludicrous.
The surge in AFDC participation, followed by a shift to 
conservative control, nurtured a backlash against public 
assistance for the poor (Cammisa 1998, 102).
The main thrust of the backlash originated in a 
perception that the entitlement to public assistance leads 
to perverse euid artificial incentives. These incentives, 
in turn, discourage marriage and promote isolation and 
dependency—a culture of poverty. This kind of thinking 
applies a rational choice explanation to a problem of 
development. Rational choice theory posits a connection 
between changes in policy and changes in individual 
behavior. This section describes rational choice theory as 
it relates to welfare reform.
The ascendeuicy of the rational choice movement in 
political science can be traced to 1957, the year Downs's 
An Economic Theory of Democracy appeared. There are 
several elements to the rational choice framework, 
including a reliance on deductive methodology and a priori 
assunqptions. According to Laver (1997, 6), "the crucial
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characteristic of the a priori approach is thus the 
generation of interesting and non-obvious statements about 
the world from a set of assumptions and a system of logic."
Denhardt (1984, 143) summarizes rational choice as it 
used in this analysis. The individual is assumed to be 
"self-interested, rational, and seeking to maximize his or 
her own utilities" (p. 143) . Self-interested individuals 
have distinct preferences that may differ from the 
preferences of others. Rational individuals are able to 
rank alternatives transitively, so that if A is preferred 
over B and B is preferred over C, then A is preferred over 
C. Maximization assumes a strategy in which the highest 
net benefit (utility) is calculated for a given situation. 
Rational choice theory suggests what we might expect 
someone to do under certain conditions.
Moffitt (1983, 1024-25; 1985, 541-42; 1987, 349-50; 
1992, 15-19; 1996, 36-37) euid others® have considered how 
individuals might react to changes in welfare policies and 
labor market conditions. The recipient who leaves AFDC in 
response to a benefit reduction exemplifies the type of
’ Albritton (1979,1009); Barr and Hall (1981,110-11); Danziger. Havemann and Plotnick (1981,979); 
Garfinkd and O ir (1974,282); Hoynes and MaCurdy (1994,43-48); Jencks (1997,35); Kaus ( 1992.115); 
Lerman (1995,17); Levy (1979,79); Peterson And Rom (1989,716-17); Plant (1984,673-76); Wolfe 
(1989,119).
74
behavior adjustment envisioned by rational choice theory.
A sufficient reduction in the welfare benefit presumably 
changes the result of a personal cost-benefit calculation 
and prompts the individual to choose additional employment.
Steeped in the traditions of economics, rational 
choice theorists envision individual behavior in terms of 
graphed curves (e.g.. Levy 1979, 78 emd 91; Moffitt 1992,
10; Parkin 1997, 342). Welfare participation analysis fits 
within a leüDor supply framework that posits the amount of 
labor a head of household would choose to supply in the 
market. As Moffitt (1983, 1024) has shown, "individuals 
are not indifferent as to the composition of their income, 
preferring a larger mix of private income than welfare 
income." Mothers who are in a position to choose between 
employment and welfare presumedaly weigh not only the 
welfare benefit, but also the value of wages available in 
the labor market.
Economic theory views individual choices between 
"work" and "welfare" in a formal sense, as decisions to 
engage in market or non-market activity. According to 
Parkin (1997, 341), a household chooses the amount of labor
The theory o f labor supply can be found in any introductory microeconomics text The following 
paragraphs and Figure 5 are adapted from Parkin (1997,341-348) and Ruffri and Gregory (1985,742-44).
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to supply as part of its time allocation decision. Time is 
allocated between two broad activities—market activity and 
non-market activity. Market activity is the same thing as 
labor market participation, or "supplying" labor.
Non-market activity refers to every other type of time 
allocation, including, but not limited to, leisure, 
education and household production. In the language of 
economists, hours spent raising children represent a 
decision not to purchase babysitting or nanny services in 
the market. Raising children is therefore considered 
household production. Other examples of household 
production include subsistence farming and fixing the 
family car. Although studies of welfare participation 
often model a "trade-off between work and leisure" as if 
raising a child is leisure, there should be no doubt that 
child-rearing belongs in the household production category.
All else being equal, a change in the value of 
producing goods and services internally would affect a 
household's labor market allocation. If, for exanple, a 
family moves to a location with poor quality child-care, 
the value of home production increases, causing a reduction 
in market activity (leJaor supplied) . Figure 4 below graphs
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the trade-off between market and non-market activity in 
terms of income.
Non-market activity comprises a broad range of 
activities. Figure 4, however, refers to non-market 
income. What is non-market income? For the purpose of 
this research, non-market income means welfare benefits, 
including cash or near-cash assistance (basically, the 
welfare check. Food Stands and Medicaid). Movement along 
the diagonal line in Figure 4 stems from adjustments to 
wage and welfare benefit levels. It would be consistent 
with economic theory to hypothesize movement upward and to 
the left as wages increase. Movement downward and to the 
right, indicating upward pressure on welfare caseloads, 
would theoretically result from benefit increases.
Barr and Hall (1981, 111-113; also see Hanoch and 
Honig 1978) emphasize that, in theory, the decision to 
substitute non-market income for market income need not be 
am "all or nothing* choice. They envision a so-called 
"dependence function, describing it in terms of four 
categories. At one extreme is the completely nondependent
"  The reader may find odd the use o f the term "dependence'* in the context o f a theory based entirely on 
choice. Is the individual choosing non-market income, or is the individual dependent? Dependence would 
appear inconsistent with choice, yet Bair and Hall use the term without addressing this inconsistency.
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household, where all income derives from labor market 
activity. Moving along the theoretical continuum leads 
next to the "partial dependence" category, where benefits 
are chosen, but they are less than earnings. The third 
category, "substantial" dependence, consists of households 
choosing more benefits than earnings. Finally, at the high 
extreme of non-market activity are those households 
choosing "total" dependence,, where 100 percent of household 
income arises from non-market activity.
If, for example, fifty percent of a household's income 
flows from market activity, then the other half must arise 
from non-market activity. A parent in that situation would 
be plotted at point M in Figure 4. Point M indicates the 
boundary shared by the partial dependence category and the 
substantial dependence category. Locations on the slope 
above M represent partial or no dependence, while points 
below M represent substantial or total dependence. The 
slope itself is commonly referred to as the budget 
constraint (or budget line). Barr and Hall's (1981) 
categories are useful because they connect abstract 
economic theory with the real world of the single parent. 
Wages, benefits euid welfare participation can all be
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quantified, allowing for testable hypotheses regarding 
their interrelationships.
The diagonal line in Figure 4 is the curve along which 
a parent moves as he or she alters the household income 
mix. Policymakers fervently hope that TANF recipients opt 
for a heavier market content. The question becomes, "What 
goes into a mother's decision to alter the income mix?" 
Economists have considered this question within a framework 
known as the theory of labor supply. The theory of labor 
supply is a starting point for generating hypotheses about 
why a parent would choose to go, or not to go, on welfare.
Labor is considered one of the four factors of 
production, the others being capital, land eind 
entrepreneurship. This means that labor is a factor 
market, not a goods market. The individual is supplier 
instead of demander. People supply labor in exchange for 
wages, euid this takes place in a leü3or market. The theory 
of labor supply posits a curve describing the eunount of 
labor an individual would supply at different wage levels. 
Figure 5 depicts the labor supply curve.
Several elements of the graph serve to illustrate the 
rational choice esqilanation of laüaor force participation. 
The most inportauit for our purpose is leüseled RW, which is
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Figure 5. The Supply of Labor 
Note: Adapted from Parkin (1997, 342)
81
a dollar amount: called the reservation wage. The lowest 
wage rate at which a household is willing to supply labor 
is that household's reservation wage. Above a certain rate 
{RW) , wages entice the household to sell labor in the 
market. As the wage rises, the amount of labor supplied 
increases. However, this relationship remains positive 
only up to a point. At some point {S) along the curve, 
increases in wages depress the quantity of labor supplied 
by the household. This "backward bend" in the labor supply 
curve represents the switch from "substitution dominance" 
to "income dominance."
At points on the curve between RW and the intersection 
of lines I auid S, wage increases are met with increased 
willingness to sell more hours of labor. This is known as 
the substitution effect. Suppose an individual earning ten 
dollars eui hour is given a dollar raise. Will the 
individual clock more hours? The substitution effect 
occurs when "the higher wage induces a switch of time from 
non-market activities to market activities" (Parkin 1997, 
341) .
The substitution effect is presumed to occur until a 
certain wage rate is reached. At this hypothetical wage 
rate, the income effect begins to dominate the substitution
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effect. When the wage rate is high, a family has already 
replaced a substantial amount of household production with 
market activity. At some point the hours become more 
precious than the earnings. More formally, the net 
marginal utility of non-market activity is potentially 
greater when a high and increasing income has already 
diminished the necessity of household production, and is 
presently causing an expansion of leisure options. It is 
worth noting that rising wage rates allow decreases in the 
quantity of labor a household supplies without necessarily 
reducing its income from market activity. At wage levels 
above the indifference point (wage rate I), leisure may 
become more precious than the marginal income from an 
hour's work. This study, however, is more concerned with 
the range around
A household must be offered a high enough wage rate to 
induce it to supply labor. According to Parkin (1997,
341) , a household will supply labor when it is "offered a 
wage rate that is at least equal to the value it places on 
the last hour it spends in non-market activities. " The 
lowest wage at which a household will supply labor is the 
reservation wage. It reflects the value placed on 
household production emd, to a lesser extent, leisure.
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Leisure options are more relevant at higher wage rates 
(i.e., rates above I).
Parents can generate income from either market or non- 
market activity, or any combination of the two. Consider, 
for example, a two-parent household. Parents A and B must 
decide on an allocation of their time between market and 
non-market activity. Perhaps A would engage in 75 percent 
market activity, with B also at 75 percent market activity. 
This would describe the stereotypical two-income family, 
with both parents engaged in high-powered careers. It 
might also describe a family among the working poor. These 
parents must spend some of their income on child-care 
because their time allocation leaves gaps during the day 
when their children lack supervision.
On the other hand, A and B could choose to engage in 
no market activity whatsoever. If, for example, a couple 
could raise sufficient food, while clothing and sheltering 
themselves and their children, market activity would not be 
necessary. Perhaps a family involved in a communal 
arrangement would be able to accomplish full reliance on 
non-market activity. Usually, however, meurket activity 
becomes necessary in the course of bringing up children.
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The necessity of market activity is felt by single-parent 
families as well.
Single mothers who earn wages at or just above RW face 
difficult decisions about time allocation. These potential 
welfare recipients would presumably consider the AFDC 
benefit as an increase in the reservation wage because the 
benefit would add value to non-market activity. Recall 
that RW reflects the value placed on non-market activity. 
Therefore, increases in the welfare benefit imply a higher 
RW. If we call the new higher reservation wage RW', then a 
household whose actual reservation wage falls between RW 
and RW' would theoretically adjust its income allocation 
toward non-market activity. This would increase the AFDC 
participation rate.
The labor supply framework is useful because it 
suggests hypothetical relationships among wage levels, 
benefit levels and welfare participation levels. With the 
new attitudes that are part of the post-entitlement era, 
welfare is currently viewed as a labor market problem. The 
prevalent view is that many single mothers are not 
supplying enough labor; instead, they are mixing in too 
much non-market income with their market income. Leüsor 
supply theory suggests that Lyndon Johnson and the Supreme
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Court reduced the attractiveness of labor market activity 
by increasing welfare benefits, eind therefore reservation 
wage thresholds, for African-Americans.
The late-1960s surge in welfare dependency was 
interesting because hypothesizing its cause is fraught with 
racial implications. Structuralists could blame capitalism 
for systematically excluding minorities from the economy. 
More interestingly, as it turned out, the "culture of 
poverty" viewpoint allowed stigmatization of AFDC 
recipients and, by association, African-Americeins, on moral 
grounds. Daniel Patrick Moynihan's The Negro Family: The 
Case for National Action (1965), for example, associates 
the poverty problem with out-of-wedlock births and the 
breakdown of family structure among blacks. Charles 
Murray's Losing Ground (1984) argues that "the statistics 
on blacks are in large part a proxy measure of trends among 
poor people of all races" (Murray 1985, 428-9). William 
Julius Wilson's The Truly Disadvantaged (1987) emphasizes 
the relatively high proportion of black men unable to 
support a family. These works bemoaned the perverse 
incentive structures that led to such a sad predicament for 
welfare recipients.
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Teles (1998, 148-152) forcefully argues that Murray 
and Wilson had enormous influence. "There is no way to 
overestimate the effect that Charles Murray's book Losing 
Ground had on the intellectual debate on poverty" (p. 148). 
Murray's proposal for the outright elimination of cash 
assistance created momentum for a new approach to poverty—  
one without the perverse incentives that undermine family 
structure. William Julius Wilson's (1987) book combined 
advocacy of strong government programs for the poor with 
concern about family stability. Foreshadowing the rise of 
the centrist Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), the 
intellectual left became open to welfare reform.
Getting the intellectual left on the reform bandwagon 
was crucial because it marked the end of "dissensus" among 
intellectual elites while marginalizing the influence of 
the old-line leftists. Proposals by David Ellwood (1988), 
Theda Skocpol (1990), Christopher Jencks (1992) and Mickey 
Kaus (1992) embraced the new "nonradical liberal" ideology. 
The result is that welfare has been a reciprocal 
arrangement, not a right. At this rare moment in history, 
intellectual elites on the left and the right agreed 
substantially with each other and, amazingly, with long- 
held public opinions (Teles 1998, 149-150). Adding fuel to
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the consensus was the perception of favorable budgetary 
impact.
Whether the problems take ideological or fiscal forms,
welfare states everywhere now face uncertainty. Moral
conundrums and budget constraints have forced policymakers
to rethink the logic of welfare entitlements. Governments
are intensely aware of the need to move people off the
dole. As welfare reform movements have taken hold in most
Western democracies, progressive notions of expanding
rights and the benefits of citizenship have been replaced.
Post-industrial economics have led to perceptions of
an "age of limits." According to Lasch (1995, 228),
The global circulation of commodities, information, 
and populations, far from making everyone affluent (as 
theorists of modernization used to predict so 
confidently), has widened the gap between rich and 
poor nations and generated a huge migration to the 
West and to the United States in particular, where the 
newcomers swell the vast armies of the homeless, 
unenç>loyed, illiterate, drug-ridden, derelict, and 
effectively disfranchised. Their presence strains 
existing resources to the breaking point. Medical and 
educational facilities, law-enforcement agencies, and 
the available supply of goods— not to mention the 
supply of racial good will, never abundant to begin 
with— all appear inadequate to the enormous task of 
assimilating what is essentially a surplus population. 
Presumably, in eui age of limits, governments can
repossess individual rights. One effect of an ideology of
limits is the tendency for welfare entitlements based on
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citizenship to be recast as conditional benefits. In the 
United States, the scope of assistance is narrowing. 
Policymakers want welfare recipients to work and get off 
the dole. With this purpose in mind. Congress instituted 
work incentives in 1967 and work requirements in 1988.
Time limits appeared in 1996 with PRWORA. Entitlements are 
gone, and each state must now articulate a vision of what 
welfare will look like.
The devolution of welfare to the states, under a block 
grant scheme, opens the door for policy innovation. The 
block grant, however, has strings attached. States face 
reductions in their grants for failing to meet work 
participation rate targets. Even before PRWORA, JOBS 
irtposed work participation rate requirements on the states. 
So, for the last decade at least, states have been devising 
ways to reduce caseloads and avoid fiscal penalties.
States are changing the incentives associated with welfare, 
competing to make assistance less attractive than 
employment and less attractive than welfare programs in 
other states. This new incentive to reduce welfare 
caseloads has prompted scholars to hypothesize a "race to 
the bottom” among states.
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One theme of John Donahue's Disunited States is that 
competition among states has always existed. Large 
corporations, for example, are routinely courted by states 
offering tax breaks and other incentives. In the context 
of devolution, increased autonomy will "raise the 
intensity, and the stake, of inter-state competition" 
(Donahue 1997, 120). Years earlier, Tiebout (1956) 
theorized about citizens expressing preferences among 
jurisdictions by voting with their feet. Thomas Dye's 
(1990, 14) text on federalism, subtitled "Competition Among 
Governments," asserts that "state and local governments 
coitpete for consumer-taxpayers by offering the best array 
of public goods and services at the lowest possible costs." 
Welfare recipients, however, inspire a different kind of 
inter-state competition.
Peterson and Rom (1989) point out the other side of 
the Tiebout hypothesis. In their view, giving states the 
responsibility for redistributive programs leads to the 
free rider problem. States "will consequently limit their 
welfare provision, hoping that some other state government 
will take ceure of it" (Peterson and Rom 1989, 711) . As 
states adjust welfare policies to discourage the in-
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migration of recipients, a "race to the bottom" takes 
shape.
A recent issue of Publius; The Journal of Federalism 
is devoted exclusively to the "race to the bottom" 
hypothesis. Empirical evidence is mixed. According to 
Lurie (1998, 89), "this competition is a political rivalry 
of the kind that leads to unpredictable and unstable 
outcomes." Johnston and Lindaman (1998, 140-2) conclude 
that Kansas continues to follow its moderate, incremental 
path in hopes of staying in the middle of the pack. Rom et 
al. (1998, 17-37), however, employing a "spatial lag" 
methodology, find that states are indeed sensitive to the 
welfare policies of their neighbors. It is not yet clear 
whether a "race" is underway, but most scholars agree that 
evolving incentive structures present a complex set of 
options to states and single mothers alike.
Welfare reforms are aimed at people who are in a 
position to choose work or welfare. When policymakers 
adjust benefit levels or eligibility requirements to 
discourage potential recipients, they en^loy the logic of
An alternative, more Rtvorable interpretation of this kind of mutual policy adjustment is the "laboratories 
o f democracy” metaphor (Schram 1998.1-2).
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rational choice theory. Consider the logic behind am. early 
reform, the Work Incentive (WIN) program.
When setting up WIN in 1967, Congress offered a 
fineuicial incentive for AFDC adults to work (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services 1998, ch. 1). For 
the purposes of determining eligibility and benefits, the 
agency would disregard a portion of earnings. Previously, 
virtually all earnings counted against the AFDC check in 
most states. The work incentive required states to 
disregard the first $30, and one-third of the remaining 
earnings. The result was that working recipients would not 
lose AFDC eligibility until their earnings were 150 percent 
of the benefit. Adjustments to benefits and eligibility 
criteria were aimed at those who had the option of working. 
By allowing earnings to actually make a difference in an 
individual's income, the government would presumably alter 
the result of individual self-interest calculations, 
eventually spurring people off the rolls.
The Work Incentive is a perfect example of the 
importance of rational choice theory under welfare reform. 
When policymakers change the way they think about 
citizenship emd social rights, many people are affected. 
Citizens of the United States, for example, now possess
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conditional benefits instead of entitlements. Moreover, 
cash assistance is conditioned on participation in work 
activities. These developments increased the 
attractiveness of work relative to AFDC. Perhaps these 
reductions in the content of social rights, and the 
personal sacrifices now being demanded, are justifiable if 
the policy goal of reducing dependency is achieved. If, on 
the other hand, work requirements do not reduce AFDC 
participation, the personal sacrifices must be justified on 
some other basis. It is therefore essential that the 
impact of these reforms be studied.
Conclusion
Dissatisfaction with the nation's welfare program has 
led to intense debate since the 1960s, but all sides seem 
to agree that employment is preferable to welfare in 
virtually every case. The pervasive sentiment is that aid 
recipients ought to be working, because work would make 
them feel like worthy members of society. The caseload 
(number of welfare recipients) reduction associated with 
putting people to work would be also good for the rest of 
us.
Nevertheless, AFDC participation rates are influenced 
by memy forces. Economic development increases the need
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for public assistance and the capacity to meet some (or 
all) of that need. The rise and fall of social rights is 
associated with expansion and contraction, respectively, of 
the welfare rolls. Social rights are now viewed 
unfavorably across a broad spectrum of ideologies.
Work requirements and time limits, which reflect the 
discursive nature of social rights, have been at the 
forefront of the reform agenda. States are manipulating 
benefit levels and eligibility requirements in hopes of 
avoiding a rush of in-migration when time limits hit.
These reforms have altered the incentives of the welfare 
system, perhaps affecting caseloads greatly. Therefore, 
any model of AFDC participation must account for 
development, policy dynamics, and the self-interest 
calculations of single mothers. Chapter 3 specifies a model 
of AFDC participation that is grounded in these theoretical 
considerations. Such a model C cu i isolate the influence of 
the JOBS program.
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CHAPTER THREE
ESTIMATING AFDC PARTICIPATION: A POOLED TIME-SERIES DESIGN 
This analysis isolates the effect of JOBS on AFDC 
participation rates. The 1988 reform curtailed social 
rights, to be sure. Did JOBS also reduce caseloads? We 
must answer the question carefully, because theoretical and 
methodological pitfalls can mar the analysis.
Welfare research sometimes suffers from specification 
error. Researchers often rely on a limited set of theories 
and predictor variables, hoping they have not omitted any 
important influences. For the present study, an 
overarching "social rights" perspective served as a guide 
to proper model specification. Development theory and 
rational choice theory generated hypotheses regarding 
interrelationships among the variables. Alternate 
variables representing similar theoretical constructs were 
tested to reduce measurement error. These model-refining 
techniques should lead to plausible results and an 
acceptable level of explained variance.
Welfare researchers face another limitation when they 
use esqperimental methods. Although these studies provide a 
wealth of information eind some significant findings, we 
Ccumot generalize those findings. A complementary method
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is to estimate aggregate changes in the participation rate 
attributable to the reform policy. This research estimates 
the effect of JOBS participation within a pooled time- 
series model of AFDC participation encoitpassing all fifty 
American states during the final thirteen years of AFDC.
Cross-state variation is conceptualized as a product 
of development, while rational choice measures capture 
year-to-year dynamics. For example, variation in per 
capita income, the main measure of development, is presumed 
to be a function of state differences primarily, without 
much time-wise variation. Wage and benefit changes, 
however, relate to day-to-day decisions regarding welfare 
and employment. Fluctuations over time are probably more 
importemt than state differences in relative wage and 
benefit levels.
Policy variables should reflect both cross-sectional 
and time-wise variation. For example, the "race to the 
bottom" thesis is represented by a spatially-lagged 
dependent variable. The indicator could vary across 
states, years, or both. This is also true of JOBS 
indicators. Some states did more with JOBS, and some years
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had more work participation than others.
Regardless of whether these expectations regarding 
sources of cross-state and time-wise variation are 
warranted, it is important to recognize that dealing with 
both types of variation should improve model specification. 
The remainder of this chapter describes the data, variables 
and model estimation methods.
Data and Variables
The dependent variable for the regression analysis is 
welfare participation— the total number of AFDC recipients 
divided by the state's population (minus those age 65 and 
over) For this research, data have been collected for 
each state for every year from 1984 to 1996. Independent 
variables that proved useful in estimating AFDC 
participation rates are listed in Table 2 and described in 
separate sections below. The discussion includes other 
variables that, although suggested by theory, failed to 
inprove the model.
"  In fact, the first five years o f the time series are coded zero for JOBS variables, since the program did not 
begin until after 1988. These "zero years" are normally employed when testing the effects of a policy 
intervention (see Box, Jenkins and Reinsel 1994, 463).
The U S. Department of Human Services (1998,18) calls this the "recipiency rate," preferring it to a 
straight caseload measure because of its stability across time.
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Table 2. Variables and Characteristics
Variables* Mean S td . Dev. Minimum Maximum
AFDC Participation 
Rate
4.64 1.61 1.17 9 J 3
Per Capita Income (in 
thousands)
17.45 4.30 8.86 33.19
Poverty Rate 13.38 4.17 2.90 27.20
Births to Unmarried 
Mothers (%)
15.19 6.80 8.20 45.30
Unemployment Rate 
for Females
6.03 1.80 2.30 13.70
Percentage Black 9.64 9.24 0.24 37.06
Average Monthly 
AFDC Payment (in 
hundreds)
3.32 1.26 0.91 7.50
Average Monthly 
Food and Drink Wage 
(in hundreds)
6.61 1.40 4.00 10.87
Spatially-Lagged 
AFDC Participation 
Rate
4.62 1.13 1.17 9.53
JOBS Participation „.i, 9.14 14.29 0.00 82.00
* All dollar figures are in current dollars.
Note: Sources for data are the Statistical Abstract (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1985-1999), the Report of 
the House Committee on Ways and Means (U S. Congress, various years), and the U S Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (1985-1999). JOBS data fi>r 1993 were provided by Lawrence M. Mead (New York University).
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Development indicators
Gronbjerg's (1977, 8-17) refinement of the 
developmental approach relies on Shils (1975, 91-107). She 
argues that modernization leads to "mass societies" in 
which the values of the center spread to the periphery. 
Policymakers become concerned with the well-being of the 
periphery as a result of expanding wealth, education, and 
democratic participation. The more modem, affluent states 
are characterized by political cultures that seek to expand 
social rights. The expansion of social rights means higher 
benefit levels, liberalized eligibility requirements, 
reduced stigma, c u id  increased participation. The less 
modem, poorer states do not expand social rights; instead 
they restrict eligibility c u id  keep benefits low. Gronbjerg 
(1977, 155) found welfare recipiency in the American states 
to be positively associated with "high mass society 
status."
The development approach stresses need and economic 
capacity as determinants of welfare recipiency.
Development creates the capacity to assist those who are 
left behind when industry euad technology advance.
Recalling the D-shaped curve in Figure 2, we e3q>ect 
economic capacity to have a curvilinear effect on AFDC
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participation. Backward states should have large caseloads 
due to the high level of need. High AFDC participation is 
expected despite a relatively low level of economic 
capacity, which constrains the benefit level. The most 
modern states should have large caseloads because of the 
mass society phenomenon, where economic expansion creates 
need for welfare and resources to pay for it. Economically 
developed states that have avoided poverty and urbanization 
problems should exhibit lower AFDC participation, as should 
any backward state with a low level of need.
Economic capacity can be measured several ways, but 
the most common indicators are gross state product (GSP) 
and per capita income (PCI). Preliminary regression runs 
indicated PCI to be the most stable predictor, so GSP was 
dropped from the analysis.Estimation of the U-shaped 
curve required the use of a squared term in addition to the 
base PCI term.^® Following Aiken and West (1991, 62-70),
PCI was centered (i.e., standardized), as was PCI-squared. 
These variables test the development thesis because their 
regression coefficients indicate the nature of the
"  According to Kincaid (1989,9), per capita income is the most widely used measure of fiscal capacity.
The use o f a  squared term introduces a high degree o f collinearity with the base term, although centering 
the variables attenuates the effect PCI and PQ^ are highly correlated, but are left in the model because 
they retain significance in each other's presence.
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relationship. A U-shaped relationship between economic 
capacity and AFDC participation is indicated if the 
coefficient of the base term (PCI) is nonsignificant, while 
the coefficient of the squared term is significant and 
positive. That finding would support Gronbjerg's mass 
societies thesis.
The increased need associated with modernization is 
operationalized in several ways. The positive relationship 
between modernization and poverty, for example, implies a 
positive relationship between poverty and AFDC 
participation. It may seem unnecessary to hypothesize a 
positive relationship between economic need and AFDC 
participation. What could be more self-evident than the 
fact that AFDC participation increases with increased 
poverty? It is possible, nevertheless, to insulate poverty 
programs from the vagaries of the poverty rate. That 
insulation is precisely the goal, at the national level, of 
the block grant approach to welfare. In spite of this 
goal, however, a strong, positive relationship between the 
poverty rate and the AFDC participation rate is expected.
Welfare participation is often associated with 
urbanization and African-Americans. The relief explosion 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s is associated with white
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abandonment of the inner cities. African-Americans fell 
behind as economic capacity developed in the suburbs.
Along these lines, Isaac and Kelly (1982) use urbanization 
as an indicator of development. This is consistent with 
the public perception that welfare is an inner-city 
problem. The proportion of a state's population living in 
cities of 250,000 or more should be positively associated 
with AFDC.
The coefficient for the African-American variable 
could take either sign. According to Gilens (1996, 602), 
"perceptions of black welfare mothers dominate whites' 
evaluations of welfare and their preferences with regard to 
welfare spending." Perceptions about the racial 
composition of welfare population influence welfare policy. 
According to Shroder (1995, 188), benefit levels are 
positively related to the proportion of AFDC households 
being "anglo." Lower benefits would lead to cui expectation 
of smaller caseloads. Gronbjerg (1977, 82) found that "the 
larger the percentage of blacks in a state, the lower the 
AFDC rolls."
On the other hand, higher proportions of African- 
Americans are also commonly associated with larger 
caseloads. Perhaps altruism caused a reaction to the
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increased visibility of poverty outside the South (Mogul1
1993, 262; Plotnick and Winters 1985, 462). Black
population more than doubled between 1940 and 1960 in the
Northeast and the Midwest, while increasing fivefold in the
West (Teles 1998, 26). Piven and Cloward (1979, 1012-13)
emphasize the pressures felt by Democratic party officials
beginning in 1948 when Dixiecrats rebelled against the
"civil rights bloc" that had "formed in the Northern wing
of the party." Electoral instability, and riots that
followed, prompted anti-poverty measures targeting urban
blacks. These community action programs, along with legal
aid for Southern blacks,
helped fuel the welfare explosion, for they both 
enlarged the volume of applicants for welfare, and 
pushed up acceptance levels by weeücening the capacity 
of the welfare system to fend off new applicants 
(Piven and Cloward 1979, 1013).
So, the presence of African-Americans drives caseloads
either up (Piven euxd Cloward 1979), or down (Gronbjerg
1977) .
Other indicators of need should be positively 
associated with AFDC recipiency rates. Rates of single­
parent families, female-headed households and out-of- 
wedlock births should covary positively with welfare, as 
these situations can easily lead to the need for
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assistance. According to Moffitt (1991, 32) , "most of the 
movements on cuid off of AFDC are the results of changes in 
family structure." Harris (1991, 494) notes that "teenage 
mothers are particularly at risk of long-term dependency." 
The expectation is a positive relationship between these 
family structure variables and AFDC rates.
Of the three family structure predictors, the 
proportion of all live births b o m  to unmarried women 
proved most stable and robust. The other two measures were 
dropped from the final equation. Of the three "culture of 
poverty" variables, the poverty rate and the number of 
African-Americans per 100 population improved the model.
The proportion of a state's population living in large 
cities was not a robust predictor, and so was dropped. 
Rational choice variables
Labor supply theory suggests relationships regarding 
wages, the value of welfare benefits, and AFDC 
participation. As the value of the AFDC check,food 
stamps,^® Medicaid,and other benefits^® rises, so should 
AFDC participation. This increase in participation would
"  Bair and Hall (1981.120); Danzlger, Haveman and Plotnick (1981.979). 
‘*M elnick(l994,185).
"  Hoynes and MaCurdy (1994.47); Kaus (1992.115); Moffitt and Wolfe ( 1992.615). 
“ Moffitt (1996.33).
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presumably reflect increases in the reservation wages of 
individual households. Conversely, wage increases should 
reduce AFDC participation (Burtless 1995, 101; Ellwood 
1994, 70-3; Lerman 1995, 17). Wage increases would cause 
some households to supply more labor, and entice others 
into the labor market by surpassing their reservation 
wages.
The rational choice perspective tries to model the 
tradeoff between employment and welfare. Benefit variables 
include the average monthly AFDC family payment, the 
average monthly value of food stamps, and a proxy for 
Medicaid. During preliminary analyses, several 
combinations of the benefits were tried. The food stamp 
benefit was not a useful predictor, nor was the AFDC 
benefit in combination with food stamps. Medicaid 
variables were also poor predictors of AFDC participation. 
The best proxy for "welfare benefits" is the average 
monthly AFDC benefit.
Employment benefits are captured by the average 
monthly wage for food and drink occupations. This wage 
rate represents a realistic wage level to be expected for 
low-income single mothers. According to Burtless (1995,
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101), the "earning capacity of most women who collect 
welfare is extremely low. " Women who are in a position to 
choose between market and non-market income presumably 
conpare the AFDC check to the paycheck they are likely to 
get. All else being equal, a higher AFDC benefit would 
increase welfare participation, while increases in the 
market wage would reduce the rolls.
Labor market effects are captured by the unemployment 
rate among females. Unemployment performs well as a 
predictor of AFDC participation (Council of Economic 
Advisers 1997, 2; Fording 1997, 19; Isaac et al. 1994, 121; 
Mogull 1993, 261; Ziliak et al. 1997, 29). The 
unemployment rate represents the performeince of the 
economy, but it also influences individual decisions. 
Sluggish economic performance should increase AFDC 
participation rates by swelling the ranks of the needy.
More important, however, is the effect of high unemployment 
on the net marginal utility of finding a job. High 
unemployment increases the competition for jobs. All else 
being equal, the net utility of the hard-to-get job falls 
below that of the easy-to-get job because more effort must 
be expended. Tight job markets also exert downward 
pressure on wages. For these reasons, higher unemployment
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rates lead to expectations of higher AFDC rates. 
Unemployment data are available by sex, so the female, male 
and overall rates were tried. All were significant and 
positive, but the female unemployment rate was more robust 
to alternate specifications of the model.
Following Rom et al. (1998, 33), the analysis also 
included a spatially-lagged AFDC benefit variable (mean 
AFDC benefit for states sharing a geographic border). In 
theory, a race to lower benefit levels would naturally 
follow from increased state-level autonomy. The race to 
the bottom thesis predicts a negative association between 
the benefit levels in surrounding states and AFDC 
participation. If higher benefits are available at an 
accessible location, say an adjoining state, recipients 
might move there. High benefit states would attract 
recipients, thereby depressing the AFDC rates of their 
neighbors.
A second indicator of interstate influences was also 
tested. A spatially-lagged dependent variable—the average 
of AFDC participation rates in surrounding states—tested 
the assumption that fleeing welfare recipients swell the 
rolls in more generous neighboring states. Consider a 
state with meager benefits. If people move away to
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neighboring states for higher benefits, falling caseloads 
in the miserly state swell the rolls in more generous 
states nearby. Therefore, if welfare recipients move about 
the states seeking higher benefits, the coefficient for a 
spatially-lagged AFDC participation measure should be 
negative, as one state's loss is another's gain.
The expectation of a negative coefficient for the 
spatial lag of the dependent variable arises from an idea 
that better benefits entice poor people across state 
boundaries. If this "welfare magnet" scenario actually 
happens, we should obtain a negative coefficient for the 
spatial lag. However, there is little evidence of welfare 
migration. Allard (1998, 48-9) found that less than one- 
half of a percent of single mothers actually moved to 
higher benefit states and received those benefits. Moving 
is expensive, while obtaining benefits in a new state can 
be quite uncertain even under generous rules. Therefore, 
welfare migration is not expected.
It seems more likely that a spatially-lagged dependent 
varicQsle would reflect not welfare migration, but the 
similar conditions among contiguous jurisdictions. Unlike 
the spatially-lagged benefit veuriable, the spatial lag of 
the dependent vcuriable should reveal the extent to which
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states in close proximity to one another experience similar 
AFDC participation rates. It seems far more plausible to 
imagine regional similarities in AFDC rates. The regional 
similarity would stem in part from interstate policy 
influences. Mutually adjusting, geographically proximate 
states theoretically would exhibit spatial dependence, 
leading to a positive coefficient for the spatial lag 
(Odland 1988, 14). Therefore, a negative coefficient for 
the spatial lag would support the welfare migrant thesis, 
while a positive coefficient would suggest mutual 
adjustments to interstate influences.
JOBS variables
A JOBS expenditure measure, an indicator of program 
scope, and the JOBS participation rate were tested for 
negative impact on AFDC rates. The scope variable is an 
additive index representing the degree to which states 
implement five program options (e.g., on the job training 
or community work experience). JOBS participation is 
calculated as countable JOBS participants divided by the 
number of nonexempt recipients. Of the three JOBS 
variables, only participation proved useful. The scope and 
expenditure measures were not robust to alternative model 
specifications.
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The source of JOBS data, the Green Book (U.S.
Congress, various years), refers to these participants as 
"countable" in contrast to a larger category called 
"active." Federal regulations require that JOBS 
participation rates be measured in terms of a 20 hour per 
week standard. The number of participants is "the largest 
number of persons whose combined and averaged hours in 
specified JOBS activities equal or exceed 20 per week"
(U.S. Congress 1996, 412). In 1994, monthly averages of 
579,213 people were active in JOBS activities, but only 
three-fourths of these participants were countable (p.
419). Those recipients not required to participate include 
pregnant mothers, mothers caring for a child under three 
years old, euad those persons working 30 or more hours a 
week.
One limitation in the JOBS data is the potential for 
biased reporting on the part of the states. However, the 
JOBS participation measure is highly stable over time. The 
year-by-year correlations for the variable (e.g., 1995 with 
1996) range from .89 to .93. In any case, the JOBS 
participation measure as calculated here is the same figure 
states were required to report to the federal government.
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If the states reported in a biased fashion, at least the 
bias was stable across years.
Nationwide, in 1994, about 44 percent of AFDC adults 
were required to participate in JOBS (U.S. Congress 1996). 
Although there was wide variation among the states on 
participation (mean for 1994 was 21.6 percent), no state 
was penalized for failing to meet the 15 percent standard 
(U.S. Congress 1996, 422). The JOBS variables were lagged 
to avoid simultaneity bias arising from mutual causation 
between AFDC participation and JOBS expenditures.
Moreover, lagging is consistent with the notion that the 
program takes time, perhaps one year or two, to produce its 
effect. One and two-year lags were tried, with the one- 
year lag performing better.
Two additional JOBS-related variables were included in 
preliminary equations. The FSA mandated child-care care 
assistance to AFDC recipients engaged in work or JOBS 
activity. Expenditure data for child-care assistance was 
divided by AFDC recipients and JOBS participants. The 
variables were removed because they did not predict 
caseloads relieüoly. Simileurly, an une:q)ectedly weak 
finding caused the removal of a "waivers" indicator from 
the final equation. Coded zero until a state's first 1115
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waiver, and 1 thereafter for each waiver obtained, the 
waiver indicator was not useful.
The analytical approach outlined in the following 
section provides a method for estimating JOBS's performance 
in reducing state welfare rolls. The relationship between 
work requirements and welfare caseloads is important 
because social rights are being chipped away on the basis 
of an unproven assumption— that work requirements depress 
AFDC participation.
Estimation Using Ordinary Least Squares 
The analysis employs a time-series cross-section 
(TSCS) design (also called pooled time-series or pooled 
cross-section design). This design is ideal when assessing 
changes over time in AFDC recipiency (Tweedie 1994, 656) .
It can be applied to many "units" (in this case states) 
while retaining the advantages of time-series analysis. 
Incorporating chauige over time is essential when evaluating 
a policy intervention like JOBS. Also, the pooling of 
states allows many independent variables to be used without 
significant loss of degrees of freedom. With 50 states and 
13 years, the N for the equation is 650.
Despite its advemtages, a TSCS design is subj ect to 
certain limitations. For example, the technique is based
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on an assumption that pooling the units (states) is 
appropriate (Beck and Katz 1995, 638). Fortunately, this 
assunption poses no theoretical problem in the case of 
American welfare dynamics, because all fifty states 
administered AFDC programs in largely similar ways. 
Moreover, residuals from preliminary data runs suggested 
only minimal unit effects.
TSCS designs are also subject to autocorrelation 
problems (Sayrs 1989; Stimson 1985). According to Stimson 
(1985, 926), however, "Cross-sectional dominance 
simultaneously minimizes the threat of autocorrelated 
error. . . and maximizes the possibility of bias (or 
inefficiency) from the specification of unit effects." 
Since this design is cross-sectionally dominant (i.e., the 
number of states exceeds the number of years), significant 
serial correlation would not be expected. Still, 
autocorrelation was investigated using the pooled Durbin- 
Watson test statistic. As expected, the errors are not 
serially correlated; therefore, the equation is estimated 
using ordineury least squares.
Following Beck and Katz (1995, 645), peuael-corrected 
standard errors (PCSBs) are calculated. Combining OLS 
parêuneter estimates with PCSEs eliminates the need for
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partitioning error variance (the “error components“ 
approach) or estimating multiple intercepts (Least Squares 
with Dummy Variables) in pooled time-series designs.
Analysts commonly use dummy variables to account for 
unit effects, but explaining variance in this manner is 
atheoretical. Since the indicators are not anchored by 
theory, their coefficients are often difficult to 
interpret. The error components approach also complicates 
interpretation of coefficients because variables are 
transformed to eliminate serial correlation.
Error components techniques are efficient, but 
inferential mistakes may result from improperly deflated 
estimates of standard errors. When analysts allow the 
autocorrelation coefficient to vary across units, standard 
errors fall drastically and thereby inflate t-scores and 
“significance" artificially. The combination of OLS and 
PCSEs, however, yields efficient, unbiased parameter 
estimates without deflating standard errors (Beck and Katz 
1995, 639-40). Significance tests will be based on these 
corrected standard errors.
A final consideration is multicollinearity. One of 
the four regression assumptions is the Absence of Perfect 
Multicollineeurity (Berry 1993, 24). Perfect
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multicollinearity, which would result from the inclusion of 
two identical independent variables in a single equation, 
is a problem because it precludes a unique least squares 
solution. The strong correlation between PCI and PCI^ has 
been mentioned (see footnote 15). However, Berry (1993,
27) points out that a base term and a squared term csui be 
included in the same equation without violating the 
assumption of the absence of perfect multicollinearity.
According to Fox (1991, 13), high variance inflation 
factors (VIPs) indicate high correlations among the 
independent variables. VIPs are derived by regressing each 
independent variable on all others in the equation. If the 
VIP for a variable exceeds four, it is highly correlated 
with other predictors. This could reduce the efficiency 
(significance) of the regression coefficients by inflating 
the standard errors. As Berry (1993, 27) points out, this 
is the primary effect of multicollinearity. Other than PCI 
and PCI^ , the wage indicator is the only variable with a VIP 
over the critical value of four. The wage variable has a 
VIP of 5.09, which pronqpts us to look for symptoms of 
multicollinearity. Since the wage variable remains 
statistically significant, while its omission does not
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affect the other coefficients, correlated predictors pose 
no problem (Berry 1993, 27).
Conclusion
The purpose of this research is to estimate the effect 
of work requirements, specifically the JOBS program, on 
AFDC participation rates. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
analysis is an appropriate technicpie for this purpose 
because it allows JOBS to be treated as a policy 
intervention (the variable is coded zero prior to 1991) 
whose caseload-reducing performance can be estimated. The 
data set consists of several varieüales measured by state 
each year from 1984 to 1996.
The strength of this pooled time-series design lies in 
its ability to euialyze the performance of JOBS in multiple 
jurisdictions over several years. This helps the analysis 
by increasing the number of cases (n size) , and by 
incorporating information from the population of states 
every year from 1984 until the end of AFDC euad JOBS. Since 
the design is theory-driven, specification error should be 
minimized. The results from this analysis of state-level 
aggregate data are generalizeable, and therefore 
complementary to site-specific e3q>erimental results. The 
next chapter outlines these findings. Then, the concluding
116
chapter explores the implications of the findings regarding 
the concerns of practitioners, theorists and poor people.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OP THE JOBS PROGRAM 
This chapter examines the results of the regression 
analysis of AFDC participation. First, the overall 
strength of the model is evaluated by reference to the 
proportion of variation explained. Next, the two 
theoretical traditions are evaluated. Finally, the 
performance of JOBS as a caseload inhibitor is discussed. 
This chapter focuses on the OLS regression equation, but 
also presents a brief case study of Minnesota as an 
illustration of the findings.
Strength of the Model 
Table 3 displays the TSCS regression model estimating 
AFDC participation for all 50 state for the years 1984 
through 1996. All the proxies for developmental forces 
take coefficients that are positive in sign and reasonably 
strong. The measures representing the trade-off between 
AFDC and employment generate estimates consistent with 
rational choice theory. The results form Table 3 also show 
that state welfare policy responds to interstate 
competition. Before discussing the estimates, it should be 
noted that the equation in Table 3 is reasonably robust.
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Table 3. Explaining AFDC Participation Rates, 1984-1996
Independent Variables
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Panel-corrected 
Standard Errors T Ratios
Per Capita Income 1.360 0.403 3.37*
Per Capita Income Squared 
Term
-0.878 0.319 -2.75*
Poverty Rate 0.114 0.020 5.77*
Percentage of Births to 
Unmarried Mothers
0.104 0.010 10.22*
Unemployment Rate for 
Females
0.302 0.037 8.21*
Percentage Black 0.027 0.003 8.75*
Average Monthly AFDC 
Family Payment
0.905 0.048 19.02*
Average Monthly Wage for 
Food and Drink
-0.524 0.060 -8.71*
Spatially-Lagged AFDC 
Participation Rate
0.189 0.033 5.81*
JOBS Participation (Lagged 
One Year)
-0.008 0.005 -1.75
Intercept -1.991 0.300 6.64*
F 100.92*
Standard Error 1.01
Adjusted R-squared .60
N =650
* = p < .01
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with an adjusted R-squared of ,60 euid an acceptably low 
standard error. The error term is random and normally 
distributed.
Evaluating the "Mass Societies" Variables
First, the coefficient of per capita income— an 
indicator of development— is discussed in some detail.
Both that measure and its square are useful in the final 
equation. The positive sign for income (b = 1.36) reveals 
that states with more economic capacity tend to have more 
people on welfare. But this is not the whole story. The 
squared income term has a negative coefficient (-.88) that 
is statistically significeuit, indicating a curvilinear 
effect.
Figure 6 below sketches the effect, in general, from a 
variable whose coefficient is positive and significant 
while the coefficient of its squared term is negative and 
significant (see Aiken and West 1994, 64-67). This graph 
is presented because it portrays in rough fashion the 
effect of per capita income on AFDC participation rates.
As state per capita income increases over the lower 
range, its effect on welfare recipiency is positive (b = 
1.36) . At the top end, increasing wealth deur^ens the AFDC 
participation rate (b = -.88). The overall effect is not
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RATE
STATE WEALTH
Figure 6. The Multivariate Effect of State Wealth on AFDC 
Participation.
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exactly as Gronbjerg's (1977, 8-17) framework would 
predict. Instead of a U-shaped curve we find a 
predominantly positive, concave downward curve. We do not 
find high AFDC participation among the backward states. 
Apparently, the increased capacity brought on by 
accelerated development expands social services, but only 
up to a point. When other factors are held constant, AFDC 
recipiency rates level off among the wealthiest states.
The positive sign for poverty shows that need also 
stimulates higher levels of welfare participation. As the 
poverty rate increases by 1 percentage point, the AFDC 
participation rate should also increase about .11 
percentage points. This finding also conports with 
Gronbjerg's mass society framework. Earlier it was noted 
that increased per capita income, a measure of capacity, 
increased AFDC (up to a point). As Gronbjerg hypothesized, 
increases in both need and capacity expand the provision of 
public assistance subsidies.
A similar effect occurs for our prime manifestation of 
social disorganization— percentage of births to unmarried 
women. Here a 1 percentage point cprowth in unwed 
motherhood produces eüaout a .10 percentage point increase 
in the AFDC recipiency rate. This confirms Mead's (1995)
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finding of a connection between illegitimacy and AFDC 
caseloads. Recall that Mead based his inference on the 
coefficients from measures of average case size.
Discovering that lower average case size was positively 
associated with AFDC caseloads, Mead deduced that lower 
average case size indicated higher levels of teen 
pregnancy. The positive and significant coefficient for 
the measure of births to unmarried women supports Mead's 
tenuous logical connection with direct evidence.
Welfare recipiency is only moderately sensitive to 
percentage black. A 1 percentage point difference among 
the states on this variable should produce about a .03 
difference in the dependent variable. This does not seem 
to be congruent with Mead's (1995, 9) finding of a 
significant negative association between percentage of 
caseload black and AFDC caseloads. However, Mead's model 
does not include a time element, nor does it adequately 
specify larger social and economic influences. The 
positive association between percentage black euid AFDC 
participation also contradicts Gronbjerg's (1977, 82) 
finding for an earlier period. Still, it is important to 
remember that the development perspective could predict the 
influence of black population proportions either way.
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As Gronbjerg (1977, 25) observes, "The presence of 
large numbers of blacks in a state may result in a 
stratification approach to public assistance, but that is a 
hypothesis which must be carefully examined. " A 
stratification approach to public assistance restricts aid 
to "those of appropriate status" (Gronbjerg 1977, 15). In 
poor Southern states, blacks may be excluded from full 
citizenship status and denied assistance. This phenomenon 
would produce a negative coefficient, as Mead found.
However, Gronbjerg found positive zero-order correlations 
between percentage black and AFDC rolls for 1960 and 1970 
(1977, 203).
Apparently, the stratification approach was not 
prevalent during the final years of AFDC. The altruism 
posited by Plotnick and Winters (1985) and Mogull (1993), 
and the social amelioration of Piven and Cloward (1971;
1979) find more support in this finding. Although its 
effect is not large (.03), the presence of more blacks in a 
state puts upward pressure on AFDC rolls.
In all, the level of economic and social development 
among states produces the expected effect— higher levels of 
modernization provide resources that enable states to 
respond more generously to those in need. At the same
[ 2 4
time, modernization produces certain dysfunctional 
consequences. The result : greater need for public 
assistance and more welfare recipients.
Evaluating the Rational Choice Perspective 
The mass societies framework is supported by the 
findings in this analysis, but what about the trade-off 
between welfare and work? The relationship between wages, 
benefit levels, and the AFDC recipiency rate is consistent 
with rational choice theory. The amount of the monthly 
AFDC check has a powerful stimulative effect on recipiency. 
The coefficient of .91 indicates that a $100 increase in 
the family benefit is associated with an estimated .91 
percentage point rise in the AFDC participation rate. The 
effect of wages (-.52) is also in the expected direction 
and statistically significant. If wages increase, AFDC 
participation falls. When benefit levels increase relative 
to wages, so does AFDC recipiency.
The smaller effect size for wages seems unusual at 
first glemce, since a dollar of AFDC would seem to be worth 
cÜ30ut the same as a dollar of wages. Why then isn't the 
tradeoff closer to a one to one ratio, instead of .91 to 
.52? The contrasting effect sizes suggest that being on 
AFDC carries benefits beyond just the monthly payment
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itself. Observers have long pointed to the ancillary 
advantages of welfare, beyond the mere money it provides.
We are unable to test for other influences directly. But 
the larger effect for the AFDC dollar compared to a dollar 
wage increase is entirely consistent with the argument that 
costs increase, especially for child care and health care, 
when women move from welfare to employment. Like AFDC 
benefit increases, these costs add to a household's 
reservation wage, and therefore put upward pressure on 
welfare rolls.
Another source of upward pressure is the economic 
cycle. The unemp 1 oyment rate among women is one of the 
stronger influences. As female unemployment goes up by 1 
percentage point, the proportion of the population on 
welfare also should climb about .30 points. For example, 
the number of AFDC recipients for the average state for 
this 13-year period is 238,150 while the mean for 
population (minus those persons age 65 and above) is 
4,378,352, indicating a 5.44 percent participation rate. 
Assume female unemployment increases by 1 percentage point, 
driving AFDC participation up by .30 to 5.74. This results 
in cüaout 13,222 additional AFDC recipients (.00302 * 
4,378,352 = 13,222) in the "typical" state.
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Evaluating the "Race to the Bottom"
The results from Table 3 also show that state welfare 
policy responds to other external factors, especially 
interstate influences. Although the spatially-lagged AFDC 
benefit measure was not a stable or reliable predictor of a 
state's AFDC participation (and was dropped from the 
analysis) , the spatial lag of the dependent variable shows 
a positive and statistically significeuit coefficient.
A 1 percentage point average increase in AFDC 
recipients (per population under age 65) in adjoining 
states increases AFDC participation in the state they all 
adjoin by .19 percentage point. This variable could be 
capturing regional effects, or perhaps states try to 
forestall welfare migration by adopting eligibility 
requirements and benefit levels similar to those of their 
neighbors. If so, they are doing a good job, since the 
coefficient for the spatial lag of AFDC participation is 
positive. A negative coefficient would have indicated 
interstate migration, perhaps due to the existence of 
welfare magnet states.
Analyzing the Effects of JOBS 
Now we come to the JOBS measure. Its -.01 coefficient 
shows a modest effect, one that falls just short of the .05
127
level of statistical significance. The probability of Type 
I error is less than .10, but above the conventional .05 
level. Still, it can be said that a 1 percentage point 
increase in the "countable" proportion of JOBS 
"mandatories" leads to a ,01 decrease in the rate of AFDC 
recipiency the following year. In the typical case a 1 
percentage point increase in JOBS participation would 
reduce the following year's AFDC caseload by adjout 350 
recipients (.008% * 4,378,352). Perhaps it is useful at 
this point to illustrate this effect, along with the other 
estimated effects, by plugging the results into an actual 
case.
Interpreting the Results: The Case of Minnesota 
In order to add some clarity to these results, a 
specific exanple applying the data to an actual state is 
appropriate. Minnesota provides a good case study. Its 
population is close to the national average for states, and 
Minnesota fits the model well (residuals low in magnitude) .
Recently, Minnesota has been in the news for the 
success of its welfare to work program (Pear 2000). The 
Minnesota Family Investment Program (MPIP) is a cutting- 
edge program that imposes tough work requirements, but also 
provides generous and ongoing support, especially child-
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Table 4. The Model Applied to Minnesota, 1995-1996
Variables Change Coefficient
Change x 
Coefficient
Change in 
Recipients
Per Capita Income .57 1.360 .7752 31.570
Per Capita Income 
Squared Term
.75 -.878 -.6623 -26.818
Poverty Rate .60 .114 .0684 2,786
Percentage of Births to 
Unmarried Women
.50 .104 .0520 2.118
Unemployment Rate for 
Females
.10 .303 .0303 1.230
Percentage Black .06 .027 .0016 66
Average Monthly AFDC 
Family Payment (CK))
-.44 .905 -.3982 -16.216
Average Monthly Wage for 
Food and Drink (00)
.26 -.524 -.1362 -5.548
Spatially Lagged AFDC 
Participation Rate
-.43 .189 -.0813 -3.310
JOBS Participation 
(Lagged One Year)
2.00 -.008 -.0160 -652
Note: Per Capita Income and Per Capita Income Squared Term are standardized by z-score (centered).
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care assistance, throughout the transition to work (Knox et 
al. 2000, 4). Minnesota would be as likely as any state to 
have succeeded with JOBS. Table 4 shows the changes 
Minnesota experienced from 1995 to 1996 to illustrate JOBS 
performance.
The AFDC participation rate for Minnesota in 1995 was 
4.47 percent. In 1996 the rate had dropped to 4.19 
percent. At the same time population, as we measure it, 
rose from 4,035,732 to 4,072,524. In 1995, Minnesota had 
180,397 recipients (4,035,732 * .0447). If this rate had 
remain unchanged in 1996, 182,042 recipients (4,072,524 * 
.0447) would have resulted. Instead, only 170,639 
recipients were reported (4,072,524 * .0419). This 
decrease amounts to 11,430 people (182,042 - 170,639). To 
what do we attribute this change from the expected number 
of cases? Table 4 predicts that only 652 are associated 
with the JOBS participation measure.
Applying the model to actual data indicates a net 
increase of 4,752 recipients due to higher per capita 
income (31,570 - 26,818). An increase of 0.6 percentage 
points in the poverty rate is associated with 2,786 
additional recipients. Births to unmarried mothers 
increased by half a percentage point, swelling the rolls by
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2,118. The one-tenth of a point increase in unemployment 
translates to 1,230 new recipients. A slight increase in 
the proportion of African Americans works out to 66 
additional recipients. The remaining variables are 
associated with decreases in AFDC recipiency.
The average monthly AFDC check in Minnesota decreased 
by $44 in 1996. This change is associated with a decrease 
of 16,216 recipients. Meanwhile wages increased by 26 
dollars a month, which would lead us to expect a decrease 
of 5,548 more people. An additional decline of 3,310 is 
ej^ected due to neighbor effects. This leaves the JOBS 
measure.
Minnesota increased its JOBS participation measure by 
two percentage points from 1995 to 1996. The mean for all 
states for all years (24%) is about the same as Minnesota's 
during those two years (19.17% and 21.16%, respectively).
As Table 3 indicates, Minnesota's increase in JOBS 
participation is associated with a decrease of 652 AFDC 
recipients. This is not a large effect, of course, when 
con^ared with the other components of the model.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the effects of several 
independent variables on AFDC participation rates. The
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overall strength of the model was confirmed by the level of 
explained variance, the theoretical plausibility of the 
regression coefficients, the random and normally 
distributed error term, and the small standard error of the 
regression. The development approach found support in the 
coefficients for indicators of capacity suid need.
Moreover, the coefficients for rational choice variables 
were consistent with theory. The nonsignificant effect for 
JOBS was also expected.
We saw in the Minnesota data a snapshot of JOBS's 
caseload reducing performance. An increase of two full 
percentage points in JOBS participation was associated with 
a decrease of just 652 recipients. This finding 
coirplements experimental results about the modest effect of 
JOBS. Given the modest effect of work requirements at the 
twilight of the AFDC era, what can be said about work and 
welfare in the post-reform era? This question is the 
subject of the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION: JOBS, TANF AND BEYOND 
The purpose of this research has been to test the 
"work" strategy for reducing welfare caseloads. The goal 
of welfare reform, agreed upon by Democrats and 
Republicans, is caseload reduction. Aggregate data were 
compiled and analyzed in order to assess the extent to 
which the "work" strategy, operationalized as the JOBS 
program, reduced welfare recipiency. Among other findings, 
a very modest, nonsignificant effect for JOBS emerged.
The 1996 welfare reform relies heavily on work as an 
antidote to "dependency." But have we any reason to expect 
work reqpiirements to spur people to leave welfare? Recent 
experience provides an opportunity to analyze the effects 
of work requirements. The Job Opportrinities and Basic 
Skills (JOBS) program was created as part of the Family 
Support Act of 1988 (FSA), a welfare reform that 
established work requirements for recipients of Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) . JOBS ccui be 
thought of as a case study in work requirements. Since the 
1996 reform relies on work requirements to reduce welfare 
participation, it is easy to justify a search for empirical 
evidence of that connection. This research analyzes the
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impact of the JOBS program in the American states. The 
effects of work requirements are estimated within a 
quantitative model of AFDC participation that draws heavily 
from two theoretical perspectives.
The "Mass Societies" perspective emphasizes economic 
development and modernization as indirect determinants of 
AFDC caseload size. A rational choice perspective proceeds 
from the assumption that individuals weigh alternatives 
before choosing public assistance. The literature provides 
some support for both perspectives, but they generate 
opposite expectations of programs like JOBS. One advantage 
in using both perspectives is this disparity. Development 
theory would not predict a significant effect from JOBS, 
but rational choice theory would (under the right 
circumstances) .
Along with these two broad perspectives, an emergent 
strain of scholarship linking a state's welfare policies to 
those of its neighbors is represented. These influences 
are captured indirectly by a "spatial lag" term summarizing 
AFDC participation in surrounding states. Although the 
variable of interest is the JOBS program, the regression 
equation also reveals information about more general issues
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in social science (e.g., modernization effects, self- 
interest calculations, and policy borrowing).
The results generally support development and rational 
choice theories. Increased capacity brought on by 
accelerated development in more modem states allows more 
generous provision of social services. Need also 
stimulates higher levels of welfare participation. Poverty 
rate increases are associated with AFDC recipient rate 
increases. As rational choice theory would predict, higher 
benefit levels auid lower wages increase welfare 
participation. The results also show that state welfare 
policy responds to other external factors, especially 
interstate competition. The coefficient for the spatial 
lag term is positive and statistically significant.
Work requirements associated with the 1988 reform have not 
significemtly affected AFDC participation rates. The 
estimate of JOBS' impact is negative, as expected, but 
quite small. A percentage point increase in JOBS 
participation is associated with a decline in AFDC 
recipiency the following yeeur of just 0.008 percentage 
points. When the model is applied to a real case, the 
magnitude of JOBS' effect on AFDC participation ranks ninth 
among ten vcuriêüsles.
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What, then, cam be said about work and welfare? Clear 
messages can be taken from the previous chapters. For 
practitioners, theorists and poor people, the messages 
might be disconcerting. Practitioners must think in new 
ways about a new mission. Theorists must evaluate the 
switch from development theory to rational choice theory. 
Working poor people must respond to a complex package of 
incentives that interacts with uncontrollable life events. 
The remaining sections of this chapter explore these 
implications of JOBS's performance.
Practi tioners
Welfare reform has asked welfare workers to transform 
themselves. Social workers of past generations were 
concerned primarily with getting the appropriate benefits 
to the people who needed them. Now, meuiy social workers 
have stepped outside the old confines of the job, evolving 
into enç)loyment agents. Social workers now want to put 
people to work and get them off assistance. The goal is no 
longer to merely establish eligibility and enroll the 
recipient, but to make sure the client (or applicant) 
enters the labor nmrket as quickly as possible.
Falling caseloads indicate at least some success, but 
the task will probably become more difficult because of the
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many barriers to employment among TANF clients. According 
to Zedlewski (1999, 4), "a large share of recipients report 
personal and family characteristics that could present 
significant challenges to work." Poor health, limited job 
experience and education deficiencies significantly reduce 
the probability of a successful transition to enployment 
(Zedlewski 1999, 2). Clients without employment barriers, 
however, have left TANF in great numbers.
Welfare agencies seem to have embraced their new role. 
Professional conferences exude enthusiasm for employment
gains. So far, however, only one side of the trade-off
between "work" and welfare has received most of the 
attention. There has been a focus on getting welfare 
incentives properly aligned so that people will flood the 
labor pool. This has entailed benefit reductions and TANF 
eligibility restrictions. However, the regression equation 
reveals another avenue of success— wages. If welfare
workers can step outside of themselves enough to stock the
labor market with single mothers, perhaps they can also pay 
attention to wages. As aggressively as caseworkers 
encourage "work, " they might also try to encourage 
employers, or policymakers, to increase wages.
In a hypothetical land where all people get off their
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couches and work, there is no need for welfare. This we 
all seem to understand; yet, we pay little attention to the 
corollary. Most people look at TANF caseloads and see 
people who aren't working. However, welfare caseloads also 
indicate a deficiency in wages. Market equilibrium 
suggests a level of wages high enough to cause people to 
supply labor in the market. People choose not to supply 
labor, theoretically, because wages are not high enough.
In a hypothetical land where all workers receive at 
least the reservation wage, there should be no need for 
welfare. In this light, public assistance may be viewed as 
a government subsidy to aggregate wages. Under laissez- 
faire economics, aggregate wages would be funded entirely 
out of profits. Unfortunately, an economy that underfunds 
wages may observe the magnitude of that decision in the 
size of the welfare caseload. Recall the negative 
coefficient for the wage varieüole. All else being equal, 
wage increases reduce caseloads. Refusals to pay adequate 
wages result in welfare cases as surely as lapses in human 
character do. Yet JOBS contains no leuiguage mandating a 
level of wages sufficient to entice people into the labor 
market. Perhaps this half-heeurted application of rational 
choice theory is to blame for the failure of JOBS to reduce
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the rolls.
Will TANF, a beefed up version of JOBS, reduce welfare
recipiency rates? Results from this research should lead
no one to expect such an effect. If work requirements
produced only a minimal effect in the face of overwhelming
contextual influences, TANF, which is not very different
from JOBS, warrants little, if any, optimism. The falling
caseloads of the TANF era are impressive, certainly. The
booming economy, however, is undoubtedly driving the
decline. Moreover, "most experts" believe that up to one-
third of the AFDC caseload was unemployable (Milbank 1997,
21) . The present analysis, which indicates only modest
caseload reduction associated with JOBS, is persuasive
because it covers a period that was not dominated by a
booming economy. At some point, the economic boom will
cool off. Only when the econony shifts downward will the
performance of TANF really be tested.
The evidence presented here gives us no reason to
expect TANF to reduce welfare participation rates. Handler
(1995, 150) suggests why reforms are unlikely to be
associated with caseload reductions.
Times are hard and everyone is sore about welfare, 
cü30ut people not helping themselves, cuid once again 
the solution is to set the poor to work in spite of
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overwhelming evidence that work policies and programs 
generally fail to reduce welfare rolls in any 
appreciable way or iitprove the economic self- 
sufficiency of the poor.
The results presented in this research are consistent with
the above assessment. We should not expect TANF work
requirements to aid in the reduction of caseloads,
dependency or social isolation. Caseloads reductions are
attributable to decreases in out-of-wedlock births and
poverty, as development would predict, and to competitive
labor markets (low unenployment) and adequate wages, as
rational choice theory would predict.
Theorists
As mentioned in the previous section, the results from 
the regression equation generally support both development 
and rational choice theories. Increased development leads 
to increased welfare participation. Higher benefits 
attract people to welfare, while higher wages reduce the 
rolls. These findings are consistent with rational choice 
theory, as is the finding that states respond to the 
actions of their neighbors, thus minimizing the probability 
of welfare in-migration. The weak finding for JOBS, 
however, calls into question the rational choice 
perspective. Rational choice appears to be eui incomplete.
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while nonetheless dominant, theoretical framework for 
welfare.
This analysis began with recognition of the tarnished 
image of the American welfare system. A program that had 
been set up to keep mothers and children together suffered 
politically when the labor force feminized. Similarly, 
welfare, as a concept in American society, suffered when 
rational choice won over the community of academic experts 
and, perforce, welfare experts. The 1962 Amendments to the 
Social Security Act embraced the rational choice version of 
welfare. This version of welfare believes that perverse 
incentives induced welfare recipients away from labor pool.
According to the rational choice argument, something 
was wrong with the incentive package. This presumably 
caused recipients to rationally supplement market income 
with non-market income. There is, however, a weeüoiess in 
the rational choice welfare argument. This weakness 
originates in the poor fit between rational choice euid 
welfare dynamics. Rational choice is an appropriate 
framework when applied appropriately; but it has been 
inappropriately applied to welfare.
When a rational choice theorist observes the existence 
of a welfare caseload, what is the interpretation of this
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phenomenon? A welfare caseload means that individuals have 
chosen non-market income over market income. If too many 
individuals are choosing too much non-market income, we 
want to reduce that caseload. It should be a simple matter 
to adjust the incentives, thereby reducing the number of 
individuals choosing non-market income. What are these 
incentives?
Two basic incentives impact a decision to pursue non- 
market income— its value and the value of its alternatives. 
Welfare reform, for rational choice theorists, includes the 
manipulation of incentives in hopes of reprogramming the 
cost-benefit calculations going on in the heads of single 
mothers. Frequently, however, only one side of the 
incentive structure gains attention. The welfare benefit 
level, perhaps because it is something that can be 
manipulated, is the subject of endless welfare research.
On the other hand, few economists would recommend 
subjecting wages to manipulation by welfare experts. The 
uneasy fit between economics and welfare illuminates both 
rational choice theory and welfare policy.
Economists believe that only the most ceurefully 
considered market interferences should be permitted 
(Friedmêui 1962, 2-3; King 1987, 80-85). The preferences
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and actions of individuals can otherwise be relied upon to 
deliver markets to equilibrium. Rational choice theory 
views a welfare caseload as a labor market problem to be 
solved. Problems are solved by adjusting incentives. 
However, to solve the labor market problem, wages must 
rise. Apparently, employers are underfunding wages if 
individuals are choosing non-market income over market 
wages. Welfare participation results from the failure of 
the labor market to arrive at an equilibrium wage that 
entices all able-bodied people to supply labor. Market 
failures are customarily corrected with government 
intervention.
In a state of perfect equilibrium, wages would 
gravitate to a level where all able-bodied workers are 
induced by one worker's share of aggregate wages. When 
wages are underfunded, either not enough workers have been 
hired to do all the tasks, or those who are working are not 
paid enough. How do we know when wages are xuiderfxmded?
Wages are underfunded when some able-bodied 
individuals choose non-market income instead of market 
income—that is, they choose welfare over work. This is 
what an economist looking at a welfare caseload also should 
see— underfunded wages. Such reasoning should make sense
143
to an economist. What makes little sense to an economist 
is the notion that incentives can be adequately adjusted by 
tinkering with welfare benefit levels while ignoring wages. 
Economists recognize that wages influence the individual's 
decision. At the same time, however, wage regulation is 
antithetical to rational choice theory. This situation 
presents a dilemma for the rational choice theorist.
Altering wages to coax people off welfare should prove 
problematic to an economist. Wages are supposedly settling 
into market equilibrium, most of the time, without help 
from the government. However, one test of wage equilibrium 
is whether the aggregate amount of wages is adequate to 
induce all able-bodied individuals to the labor force.
Only when that condition is met should we expect no one to 
choose welfare. When wages are underfunded, rational 
individuals should be expected to choose non-market income.
Unfortunately, wages will be inadequate when jobs are 
scarce. During a recession, employers demand less labor, 
lowering wages. A reduction in wages, for an economist, 
would undoubtedly impact the individual cost-benefit 
calculations regarding market and non-market income. All 
else being equal, lower wages would be logically consistent 
with additional (also fully rational) welfare recipients.
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If employers always funded wages adequately, there 
would never be a need for non-market income (e.g., 
welfare). Sadly, welfare experts focus elsewhere. The 
problem is presumably not wage levels, but a perverse 
incentive structure and a lack of "individual 
responsibility." Welfare recipients somehow possess bad 
preferences (which are, by definition, impossible), 
choosing not to enter the leüsor market. These rational 
choice welfare experts developed, at great expense, a 
welfare-to-work program based on this incongruous, welfare- 
specific version of rational choice theory. The program 
did not accomplish its stated goal. JOBS, a product of 
rational choice theory, failed to reduce AFDC 
participation. This failure of rational choice theory 
should not be surprising, however, given wages that are 
politically sacrosanct, euid exempt from manipulation.
Rational choice finds welfare to be a great challenge, 
and must bend over backwards to explain its dynamics. To 
really coax people into the labor force, you might need to 
adjust wages. However, since economists don't like that 
sort of market interference, they take rational choice 
theory in an unusually inefficient direction. They stop 
being non judgmental about preferences, and no longer view
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individuals as rational utility maximizers. Since wage 
interference is inconsistent with rational choice theory, 
economists switch to a different type of thinking. They 
incorporate a nonliberal, judgmental interpretation of 
welfare recipiency.
In a rational choice world, all preferences are 
supposedly equal. But to welfare economists, preferences 
for non-market income are somehow less equal. When 
dabbling in welfare, rational choice theorists forget their 
theoretical underpinnings euid give in to an ancient 
temptation. Normatively evaluating preferences, they 
violate the basic liberal principle. The liberal 
tradition, from which rational choice theory evolved, seeks 
at all costs to avoid declaring some preferences good and 
others bad. Therefore, welfare paints the economist into a 
comer, for she must acknowledge that controlling the 
incentives means controlling wages. Instead of tinkering 
with wages, however, she blames the rational individual—  
the recipient— for being rational.
Development theory did not survive the multi­
disciplinary shift to rational choice. The paradigm 
surrendered prominence even in a policy area for which it 
was well suited. Development theory and welfare made sense
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in each other's contexts, because each is a part of the 
other's context. Development theory denies that choice has 
much to do with welfare. Some people belong to groups that 
are left behind. In those cases, according to development 
theory, market income should be supplemented by non-market 
income.
Rational choice and welfare, on the other hand, do not 
work well together. When the subject is welfare, rational 
choice scholars tell us it is bad to choose non-market 
income. This is uncharacteristic because choices are 
presumably based on preferences, which are taken to be 
exogenous. Exogenous preferences are not good or bad, they 
just are. Therefore, an economist should be quite 
reluctant to say either that a welfare recipient is bad, or 
that she is not rational, for simply choosing A over B. 
"Good" and "bad" are normative, and do not apply, while 
rationality is absolutely presumed.
Development theory and welfare grew up in symbiosis. 
They had reasons, to be together. Then, something strange 
happened when rational choice replaced development theory—  
welfare policy stopped being about welfare. It is 
unfortunate, at least for welfare, that development theory 
has held little sway in the American states. Our welfare
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policy has not been about welfare since rational choice 
theory became dominant. No one denies the inadequacies of 
development theory, but it was at least connected to 
welfare. Moreover, the encroachment of rational choice 
theory into welfare policy has not led to the 
accomplishment of stated objectives.
Rational choice theory is concerned with welfare as an 
aspect of the labor market. The application of rational 
choice theory to welfare is perverse, because welfare 
corrects the glaring deficiencies of the rational choice 
perspective. Welfare is about the gaps in human survival 
left by capitalists. Rational choice thinking applies to 
some policy areas; but welfare is different. Rational 
choice theory has been thrust upon it for largely 
political, not scientific, reasons. Few policymakers seem 
to care whether the rational choice approach actually lifts 
people up from dependency. They do seem confident that 
another objective is within sight— expanding the ledaor 
pool.
It is now the job of welfare agencies to provide the 
firms of the U.S. with ein abundant labor pool. Welfare 
agencies are to put people to work. Since the domineuice of 
rational choice theory was visited upon welfare policy.
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welfare has become a development horse pulling a rational 
choice cart. Is this good or bad? What ends are served? 
Perhaps welfare itself, like development theory before it, 
will soon be elbowed out by rational choice theory.
However, there is a corollary.
Free market approaches to the labor market problem 
have resulted in underfunded wages. We know this because 
we have seen preferences for non-market income among actual 
individuals— the welfare recipients. But we are unwilling 
to demand adequate wages from employers, so we instead 
require people to work even when their responses to actual 
incentives would differ. Applying rational choice to 
welfare has resulted in a glaring incongruity for rational 
choice theorists. These theorists are telling people to 
either change their bad preferences to good ones (i.e., 
leam how to prefer a low wage) or stop behaving rationally 
(i.e., choose what you do not prefer). This strange 
posture for rational choice theorists illuminates the 
inappropriateness of its application to welfare caseload 
dynamics.
The Working Poor 
America's brief experiment with social rights has 
ended. The feminization of the labor force and the
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hegemony of rational choice theory fueled a belief among 
Americans that able-bodied people should participate in the 
labor market. Labor market participation has acquired 
"virtue" status. People are now expected to participate in 
the labor market, regardless of circumstances. Welfare 
reform has embodied this expectation.
The brief interlude of social rights runs 
approximately from the death of John F. Kennedy until the 
1980s. Soon after assuming the Presidency, Lyndon Johnson 
launched the Great Society programs, ensuring access to 
public assistance according to national standards of need. 
Supreme Court decisions of the late 1960s and early 1970s 
affirmed the entitlement status of AFDC. These 
affirmations proved ephemeral, however, especially when 
conservative governments came to power.
Beginning in 1967 with WIN, earnings disregards were 
employed to entice people into the labor market. Twenty- 
one years later, the FSA imposed work requirements, euid 
accompanying sanctions, on non-exempt AFDC recipients.
Then, in 1996, PRWORA added the requirement that states 
reduce their caseloads. The end of social rights could be 
marked by the 1986 recommendation of the Domestic Policy 
Council that states be given wide latitude to design and
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implement demonstration projects. This policy direction 
ensured the death of social rights by throwing the doors 
open to the states to experiment with new approaches to 
w e l f a r e . T h e  approach so far has been to require labor 
force participation in most cases. The work requirement 
makes the welfare benefit conditional upon a performance, 
thus removing it from the constellation of rights. Public 
assistance is not a right, but a conditional outcome.
The entitlement status of AFDC was attacked as 
encouraging dependence, and therefore blamed for the ever- 
expanding welfare rolls. Conservatives expressed moral 
outrage at able-bodied and second-generation recipients, 
while liberals criticized the system's adverse effects on 
African-Americans. To liberals, caseload reduction was 
desirable to the extent that it reflected poverty reduction 
and the cultural assimilation of African-Americans. For 
conservatives, caseload reduction, the primary goal of 
reform, was intrinsically desirable. The chosen method for 
achieving caseload reduction has been the "work first" 
strategy. This strategy enphasizes errployment over 
education and training.
It is. by contrast, quite unlikely that states would ever be encouraged to conduct murder trials, which 
involve civil rights, in varied and innovative ways.
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Unfortunately, the work strategy is not only misguided 
in a theoretical sense (see above section), but also fails 
to lift people out of welfare "dependence." JOBS 
participation did not significantly affect AFDC 
participation. What does this tell the single mother about 
TANF? According to the logic of reform, reducing AFDC 
participation is a necessary condition for reducing the 
tragedies associated with dependence and cultural 
isolation. A reform that does not affect the AFDC 
recipiency rate is not, according to the logic of reform, 
reducing dependency or breaking the cycle of poverty. And 
JOBS did not affect AFDC participation rates. Did it do 
anything?
JOBS did many things. First, it closed off options 
for people near the bottom of the income ladder. Second, 
it stigmatized AFDC recipients, although these people 
already had a severe image problem. Third, JOBS sanctioned 
families and households for failing to meet work 
requirements. In sum, JOBS, and welfare reform in general, 
have made public aid recipients worse off. Moreover, the 
punitive euid harmful consequences that JOBS delivered only 
half-heartedly, TANF promises whole-heartedly.
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Conclusion
It would appear that the actual purpose best-served by 
reform is not really caseload reduction. JOBS did not lift 
people up from dependence. If JOBS did not help people up 
from dependence, it could only have been detrimental to 
social service clients. This is because JOBS diminished 
the content of social rights. TANF represents the same 
kind of thinking about welfare and about human nature.
Still, some importeuit differences between JOBS and TANF 
suggest a larger impact from the latter reform.
Unlike TANF, JOBS was not implemented with vigor.
Glazer (1995, 24) comments on the JOBS program’s 
"remarkably limited" expectations for moving people off 
welfare. For exanple, JOBS participation was not required 
of mothers with children under three years of age, while 
the TANF exenption applies only to mothers with children 
under one year. Rising state budgets and the national 
recession also constrained JOBS, as many states had to 
forego federal matching funds available under FSA. Because 
of such constraints, JOBS served a relatively small subset 
of AFDC parents (U.S. General Accounting Office 1994, 2).
As Mead (1997, 68-9) points out, it was more likely under 
JOBS for a welfeure recipient to be non-working and not
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involved in an employment program. Nathan (1993, 121) 
agrees that implementation of JOBS fell short. JOBS work 
supports, including transitional Medicaid and child care 
benefits, were not provided on a large scale to working 
poor families.
TANF has been called "an intensification of both the 
obligation and the opportunity dimensions" of earlier 
reforms (McGroder et al. 2000, 6). JOBS programs often 
emphasized education and training, but TANF emphasizes work 
first. The philosophy under TANF is that any job is a good 
job. Public aid recipients must be working within two 
years of the time they start receiving TANF. Federal TANF 
funds cannot be used to extend aid beyond sixty months to 
any individual, and states are required to meet work 
participation targets.
With respect to opportunities, TANF contains "greater 
supports for work, with almost all states now treating 
earnings and assets more generously, and significantly more 
federal funds available for child care" (McGroder et al. 
2000, 6). TANF also closes off options. One exanqple of 
this is the fact that college no longer qualifies as work 
participation. Students must fulfill the work requirement 
in addition to their study obligations to retain the TANF
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grant while in school. The message seems clear. It is 
more important to increase the supply of labor than to 
invest in human capital.
The differences between JOBS and TANF suggest a 
possibility that TANF could be partially responsible for 
the dramatic decline in welfare recipiency. In addition to 
a robust economy and expanding demand for workers, the 
intensified approach to labor activation would 
theoretically reduce caseloads. If the main problem with 
JOBS was weak implementation, TANF may be working.
Perhaps a model for success, the Minnesota Family 
Investment Program (MFIP) imposes tough work requirements 
while also providing generous earnings disregards and 
ongoing support, especially child-care assistance, 
throughout the transition to work (Knox et al. 2000, 4) . 
Earnings disregards and work supports reduce dependency 
because they "make work pay." To the extent that sanctions 
and requirements are supplemented with work supports like 
child-care, room for optimism exists. It is important to 
remember, however, that as of this writing Minnesota is 
exceptional in this regard. States are required to use the 
stick, but the carrot is optional (Jencks 1997). Given the
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uncertainty associated with state flexibility, the more 
reliable answer to welfare dependency is wage growth.
The future of public assistance, at least in the forms 
to which Americans have been accustomed, seems very much in 
doubt. It is anyone's guess what the new world of low- 
income survival will look like. The history of welfare 
reform, and of JOBS and TANF in particular, suggests a 
parade of ineffective "solutions" based on inappropriate 
theories euid inaccurate beliefs about welfare recipients.
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